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I. INTRODUCTION
The story of the public trust is eternally unfolding. In recent
chapters, the public trust has claimed a central role in western wa-
ter rights law-a development considered the "most significant
expansion of public trust principles" in the past few decades.2 In
retrospect, this increasingly close relationship between the public
trust and western water rights makes abundant sense. Western
states3 largely adhere to the principle that the waters of the West4
belong to the states for the benefit of their people.5 Further, the
2. Richard M. Frank, The Public Tost Doctrine: Assessing Its Recent Past & Chating Its
Futiure, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665, 675 (2012). In 2011, Frank and other scholars presented
their analysis at U.C. Davis's public trust symposium. Symposium, The Public 7'ns/ Doctrine:
30 Years Later; 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 Symposium]. This sym-
posium revisited U.C. Davis's 1980 public trust symposium, 7Te Public 7rust Doctine in Nat-
ural Resources Low and Management: A Symposium, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 181 (1980), wherein
participants noted the beginnings of this doctrinal extension toward water rights. 2012
Symposium at 669 n.10 (citing Harrison C. Dunning, The Significance of Cali/ornias Public
Trust Easementfoi Caliinnia Water Rights Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 357 (1980); Ralph W.
Johnson, Public Timst Proiection flu Stream, Flows and Lake Levels, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 233
(1980)). Northwestern School of Law of Lewis & Clark College held a public trust sympo-
sium in the intervening years, Symposium, Public Trust and the Water of the American West:
Yesterday, Today and Tomnorrow, 19 ENVTL. L. 425 (1989), with scholars such as Wilkinson
describing the same expansion. Wilkinson, su/na note 1, at 466.
3. For purposes of this article, the western states encompass those that apply prior
appropriation or a hybrid model that includes appropriative principles: Alaska, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyo-
ming. See generally Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western State' Public Tust
Doctrines: Public Values, Private Righis, and the Evolu/ion Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37
ECOLOGY L.Q 53 (2010) [hereinafter Craig, A Comparative Guide]. Craig notes that while
states of the East and West exhibit some similarities in their approach to the public trust,
the states classified as western have notable distinctions, including differences in their arid-
ity, their tests for determining navigability, their systems of water law, and their declara-
tions of public ownership over waters. Id. at 56-57.
4. While many of this article's observations likely apply to states in the East, its analy-
sis is limited to the western states. The West is the locus of the judicial trend extending the
public trust to water rights, and it is there that the doctrine of prior appropriation (allow-
ing private water uses to deplete a water source) is arguably in greatest tension with public
trust values.
5. Most western states declare ownership of their waters through their constitutions,
although a handful do so through statute. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 3 ("Wherev-
er occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to the people for
the common use."); MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3(3) ("All ... waters . . . are the property of
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majority of these states recognize that state ownership of waters
places a public trust over those waters.6 It was only a matter of
time, then, until some western state courts extended this line of
logic: if there is a public trust over waters, that trust must inexora-
bly govern individual rights to appropriate those waters for private
use. Under this doctrinal extension, the public trust's principles
must imbue the state agency process of issuing and amending wa-
ter use permits.' Agencies must assess how proposed water appro-
priations will impact the public trust, and appropriators must un-
derstand that the trust limits their private rights of use.
But this doctrinal extension bucks a centuries-old tradition of
treating private water rights as separate from the public trust, and
the vast majority of western state water codes still lack public trust
provisions today.8 Particularly concerning has been the assumption
that existing "public interest" provisions within water codes can
stand in for public trust review. These provisions, which often date
to the turn of the nineteenth century, are the very antithesis of the
public trust because they are highly discretionary and permit any
manner of political interests to be considered in a water use permit
decision. A common example is the agency use of public interest
provisions to favor water-consumptive mining, irrigation, and mu-
nicipal projects based solely on their expected economic benefits,
without consideration of public trust values.9 Public interest provi-
sions thus are not a statutory quick fix for bringing water codes in-
to compliance with public trust law. More meaningful reform is
needed to truly protect our important water resources.
Part I of this article describes the traditional public trust prin-
ciples that apply to waters, as well as the modern judicial trend of
the state for the use of its people . . ."); N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 2 ("The unappropriated
water ... is hereby declared to belong to the public . . . ."); N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 3 ("All
flowing streams and natural water courses shall forever remain the property of the state ...
."); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.025 (2012) ("The water of all sources of water supply with-
in the boundaries of the State .. . belongs to the public."). See generally Craig, A Compara-
tive Guide, supra note 3 (providing a comprehensive compilation).
6. See Craig, A Comparative Guide, supra note 3, at 76-80 (summarizing those states'
public trust laws). The exceptions are Idaho, Colorado, and potentially Arizona. See discus-
sion infra notes II and 38, and Part II.D (discussing these states' exceptions).
7. While strong arguments exist that the public trust also operates retrospectively on
existing water rights, this article focuses prospectively on new permitting and change-of-
use decisions. See, e.g., A. DAN TARLOcK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND REsoURCES § 5:57
(2012) (discussing several cases recognizing the trust's application to existing rights).
8. California is the exception, although even its provisions can be strengthened. See
discussion infra Part I.C.4.
9. See discussion infra Part II.C.
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extending these principles to water use permitting in the West.
This part also briefly grapples with the unresolved question of
whether a state legislature can unilaterally eliminate its public trust
obligations-a question that affects the ultimate scope of this arti-
cle. If, as some scholars contend, states cannot eliminate their pub-
lic trust obligations, then this article potentially applies to water
codes throughout the West.' 0 If, as other scholars contend, states
can so limit the trust, then this article nonetheless applies to the
vast majority of western states that continue to recognize a public
trust over waters." Under either scenario, the water codes of the
affected states reveal themselves to be outmoded legal regimes that
promote private uses without adequately protecting the public
trust.
Focusing on an area of particular concern in water codes, Part
II analyzes the risky implications of supplanting the public trust
doctrine with existing public interest review provisions. While the
public interest and the public trust may at first blush appear to oc-
cupy common territory, the two are distinguishable in their legal
origin, standard of review, purpose, and scope of coverage. Thus,
permitting agencies must assess public trust impacts using a dis-
tinct analysis grounded in public trust law.
Finally, Part III advances a water use permitting framework that
better fulfills the states' public trust responsibilities. Drawing on
the best public trust ideas from around the West, this part recom-
mends water codes that include: definitions and criteria that dif-
ferentiate the public trust from the public interest; procedural re-
quirements that ensure water use applicants demonstrate a lack of
substantial impairment to the trust before a use permit issues; and
permit conditions that preserve a state's right to modify or revoke
a permit if a water use ultimately impairs the trust. Beyond permit-
10. See discussion infia Part I.B.
11. See discussion inifa Part I.B. Colorado and Idaho are the clearest cases of states
that have declared that the public trust does not apply to their waters. Arizona is a third
possibility. See discussion in/rn Part IID, regarding legislative attempts in Idaho and Arizo-
na to eliminate or restrict the public trust. In Arizona, the courts have struck down the leg-
islation thus far. In Colorado, the state supreme cout t made the sweeping conclusion that
most Colorado waters are non-navigable and therefore not subject to public trust protec-
tions. Stockman v. Leddy, 129 P. 220, 222 (Colo. 1912), Qverruled on other grounds by United
States v. City and Cnty. of Denver, 656 P.2d I (Colo. 1982). The Colorado Supreme Court
also held that the Colorado Constitution does not recognize a public trust over waters.
People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Colo. 1979).
2872013]
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ting laws, this part also explains why the judicial and executive
branches play a critical role in creating the larger context for pub-
lic trust protection. The judiciary should vigilantly guard against
confusion of the public trust and public interest, and rigorously
scrutinize permitting decisions that implicate the public trust.
Likewise, agencies engaged in statewide water planning should
squarely address how that planning impacts the public trust,
thereby laying the foundation for more informed water use per-
mitting decisions. The article concludes that these affirmative steps
are legally necessary to bring the West's water laws into better
alignment with the public trust.
II. THE PUBLIC TRUST'S LOGICAL PATH TOWARD WATER RIGHTS
A. The Baseline: Traditional Public Trust Principles
While states vary in their articulation of the public trust doc-
trine, water scholars note a common doctrinal baseline to which
states adhere.12 Justice Stephen J. Field articulated this doctrinal
baseline in the United States Supreme Court's seminal decision Il-
linois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois.13 In that case, the Court held
that states have a trust responsibility over "navigable waters and
[the] soils under them." 14 That trust responsibility limits a state's
legislative powers over trust resources, so that states cannot place
them "under the use and control of private parties" if that private
use would substantially impair the public's use of the waters.' 5
Based on this trust duty, the Illinois Legislature could revoke its
prior transfer of Chicago's harbor to Illinois Central Railroad, be-
cause such a significant transfer imperiled the public trust purpos-
es of navigation, commerce, and fishing on Lake Michigan.' 6
Although Illinois Central concerned the beds beneath navigable
waters, the case speaks of both the beds and their waters belonging
. 12. Michael C. Blumm, Harrison C. Dunning & Scott W. Reed, Renouncing the Public
Thist Doctrine: An Assessment of the Validity of Idaho House Bill 794, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 461, 482-
93 (1997); Craig, A Comparative Guide, supra note 3, at 71; Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 464 &
n.164. But see discussion infra Part I.B (acknowledging the unresolved question of whether
state legislatures can unilaterally eliminate this public trust baseline).
13. IIl. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
14. Id. at 453.
15. Id. at 453.
16. Id. at 463-64. Navigation, commerce, and fishing are the three purposes tradi-
tionally protected by the public trust. See discussion infra note 36 (defining these con-
cepts).
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to the public," and it is well established that the public trust doc-
trine covers both resources.' 8 Indeed, it would make little sense to
delimit the trust to beds alone if all overlying public waters could
be alienated to the detriment of commerce, navigation, fishing, or
other state-recognized trust purposes that depend on those waters.
From Justice Field's words have come certain baseline princi-
ples traditional to the public trust doctrine. The first principle is
that the state, as trustee over the trust resources, has delimited au-
thority to permit private use or control of trust property.' 9 State
legislatures and administrative agencies cannot avoid this respon-
sibility by simply conveying the trust resource into private owner-
ship.20 Before allowing private interests to use trust resources, the
state must first determine that the public, the trust beneficiary, will
not be substantially harmed.2' In instances when harm will not oc-
cur, when harm is insubstantial, or when the trust resources are
benefitted, the state may permit private uses.22 When states do au-
thorize private uses, they often impose conditions to protect the
public's trust interests.23 As trustee, the state's duty is also ongo-
ing-it must engage in oversight throughout the period of private
17. Id. at 453.
18. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctri-ne in Natural Resource Law: Eiectiveljudicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471, 556-57 (1969-70) (noting that the historical, "quite nar-
row" scope of the public trust includes "the waters over [submerged public] lands, and the
waters within rivers and streams of any consequence"); see a/so TARLOCK, sura note 7,
§ 5:56 ("All western states declare that some or all water is owned in trust for the public.");
78 AM.JUR. 2D Waters § 4 (2012) (stating that the trust covers "natural streams and other
bodies of water"); HARRISON C. DUNNING, 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 30.02(e) (3d ed.
2011) (recognizing the same). But (f. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 58-1201 to -1203 (2012) (legis-
latively nullifying the Idaho Supreme Court's holding that the trust applies to waters);
Stockman v. Leddy, 129 P. 220, 222 (Colo. 1912), overruled on other giounds by United States
v. City and Cnty. of Denver, 656 P.2d I (Colo. 1982) (concluding that most Colorado wa-
ters are non-navigable and therefore outside the public trust).
19. Ill. Cent. 1LI, 146 U.S. at 453-54; HERBERT T. TIFFANY & BASIL JONES, 2 TIFFANY
REAL PROPERTY § 659 (2012); 78 AM. JUR. 2D Watery, sujna note 18, § 4; DUNNING, suna
note 18, § 30.02(c).
20. II. Cent. XRIL, 146 U.S. at 453-54; DUNNING, supn note 18, § 30.02(c).
21. TARLOCK, sura note 7, § 8:18 (noting that state decisions to alienate trust inter-
ests "must be consistent with trust purposes"); Blumm et al., supra note 12, at 465 (discuss-
ing how agencies should consider trust impacts and provide mitigating conditions before
approving private interests in trust lands and water). Illinois Cenoal supports this logic as
well in its holding that alienations that substantially impair the public trust are improper.
146 U.S. at 453.
22. Ill. Cent. 141, 146 U.S. at 453-54; DUNNING, sup.ra note 18, § 30.02(d) (3).
23. Blumm et al., sufrra note 12, at 465-66.
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use to ensure trust purposes are not substantially impaired.24
The second principle is that the party using the trust resource
does so subject to the trust. The public trust, in other words, func-
tions as an easement or servitude upon private use interests. 25 Un-
der this servitude, the state retains oversight and can adjust the
terms of the private interest, or revoke the interest altogether, to
protect trust resources.26
A third principle is that the judiciary plays a vital role as gate-
keeper of the trust, acting as a check on the legislature and agen-
cies that wield decision making authority over trust resources.27 In
his seminal work on the public trust, Joseph Sax noted: "When a
state holds a resource [for] the general public, a court will look
with considerable skepticism upon any governmental conduct
which is calculated either to reallocate that resource to more re-
stricted uses or to subject public uses to the self-interest of private
parties." 28
24. This logic is supported by Illinois Central's statement that transfers of public trust
resources to private parties remain "subject to revocation." 146 U.S. at 453; see also
DUNNING, supna note 18, § 30.02(d)(1) ("[A] legislative grant of state sovereign resources
to a private party is inherently subject to revocation . . . .").
25. Wilkinson notes instances where the U.S. Supreme Court has described the trust
in such terms. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 450 n.102, 459 & n.138; see also DUNNING, supra
note 18, § 33.01(a) (noting the "conventional understanding" that the trust functions as
an easement).
26. Ill. Cent. RR, 146 U.S. at 453; DUNNING, supra note 18, § 30.02(d) (1).
27. TARLOCK, supra note 7, § 8:18 (noting that trust limitations "are enforced pri-
marily by the courts").
28. Sax, supra note 18, at 490 (original emphasis removed). As argued below, court
review of public trust decisions should thus approximate constitutional review, with courts
considering de novo those legislative and administrative acts affecting trust resources. See
discussion infra Part III.B. For an explanation of the de novo review that courts generally
apply to constitutional questions, see CHARLES H. KoCH,JR., 4 ADMIN. L. & PRAC. § 11:11
(3d ed. 2012) ("[Clourts have dominant authority over constitutional questions. Courts
are free to conduct de novo review of an administrative resolution of a constitutional issue.
This means that they are in no sense bound by an agency's constitutional determina-
tion.").
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B. A Lingering Question: State Powers to Define the Public Trust
While scholars are in general accord that there are traditional
baseline principles governing the public trust, there remains a crit-
ical, unresolved question in public trust jurisprudence: Is a state
free to abolish the public trust doctrine or lessen its protections
below the traditional baseline? 9 Although full analysis of the ques-
tion is beyond the scope of this article, a brief discussion is war-
ranted since the extent of state trust powers ultimately dictates the
number of western states to which this article applies.30
Ultimately, the answer to the question of state trust powers lies
in the source of the public trust doctrine, which is a subject of
great debate. Many scholars and courts view the source as some-
thing beyond mere common law or legislative prerogative. Until
recently, one conclusion has been that the doctrine emanates from
the U.S. Constitution or some other federal law source.31 Charles
Wilkinson, for example, has previously argued that "the fairest and
most principled conclusion is that the public trust doctrine is root-
ed in the commerce clause and became binding on new states at
statehood." 32 But in the 2012 case PPL Montana, L.L.C. v. Montana,
the U.S. Supreme Court stated in dictum. that "the contours of
th [e] public trust do not depend upon the Constitution" because
" [u]nder accepted principles of federalism, the States retain re-
sidual power to determine the scope of the public trust over waters
within their borders."3 3
Relying on principles of federalism, several western states have
29. DUNNING, supra note 18, at § 30.01(b) (1) ("From one point of view, to permit a
state to abandon a right it held as an incident of sovereignty is to accord that state a free-
dom of action entirely consistent with its sovereign status in this realm. From another
point of view, however, such freedom of action allows a state to defeat the very public right
that was the basis for recognition of sovereign ownership of these lands in the first
place.").
30. See discussion suira note II and infr/ Part II.D (discussing Idaho, Colorado, and
potentially Arizona as states seeking to eliminate the public trust).
31. See, e.g., Blumm et al., supra note 12, at 483; Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 459; see
also discussion inftw Part I1.B (discussing state court decisions recognizing the same). Bia
seeJames L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths: A listory ofthe Public Trust Doctine, 18
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 1, 7-9 (2007) (questioning the prevailing view).
32. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 459.
33. PPL Mont., L.L.C. v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1235 (2012). The Supreme Court
contrasted the public trust doctrine with the equal-footing doctrine, which does provide a
"constitutional foundation for the navigability rule of riverbed title." Id.
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expanded the scope of the public trust in a couple of key ways.
First, a number of states have expanded the resources of the trust
to include waters that would not meet the narrower, federal defini-
tion of "navigable," 34 such as groundwater and non-navigable lakes
and streams that are capable of recreation.35 Second, several states
have expanded the traditional purposes of the public
trust-navigation, commerce, and fishing 36-to include broader
recreational activities, instream flows for fisheries, and habitat pro-
tection.37
On the other hand, the Arizona and Idaho legislatures have
sought to nullify the public trust's application to state waters.38
While one possible reading of PPL Montana might support such ac-
tions as part of a state's retained "residual power," 9 some scholars
34. In the context of state streambed ownership, federal navigability looks at waters
on a segment-by-segment basis" to determine whether those waters were "navigable in
fact" at the time of statehood, either because they were used or were "susceptible to being
used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce." Id. at 1228 (quoting The
Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (I Wall.) 557, 563 (1870)).
35. Hawaii and Montana are notable examples, with Hawaii's public trust extending
to groundwater, and Montana's public trust extending to all waters capable of recreational
use, regardless of whether they meet the federal test for navigability. Craig, A Comparative
Guide, supra note 3, at 77, 126. California extends its trust to tributaries of navigable waters.
Id. at 114.
36. Dunning explains that, historically, navigation and commerce "had in mind
the waterborne type-that engaged in by navigating vessels" and that fishing "cover[ed]
the gathering of shellfish as well as the taking of floating fish." DUNNING, supra note 18, at
§ 31.01. Related construction of "wharves and other necessary aids to navigation" were
typically included as well. Id.
37. California (ecological trust for biodiversity), Hawaii (biodiversity, customary and
traditional native rights, and domestic drinking water), and Montana (fishing and other
recreational uses) again provide notable examples. Craig, A Comparative Guide, supra note
3, at 80-88, 123-24, 141; see alo Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting to Climate Change: The Potential
Role of State Common-Law Public Trust Doctrines, 34 VT. L. REV. 781, 814-28 (2010) [hereinaf-
ter Craig, Adapting to Climate Change] (discussing the various. ways that public trust defini-
tions have evolved in different states).
38. See discussions supra note 11 and infra Part IID, regarding Idaho's ahd Arizona's
legislative attempts to eliminate or restrict the public trust. The Colorado Supreme Court
arguably restricted the public trust baseline as well when it made the sweeping conclusion
that most Colorado waters are non-navigable, and therefore not subject to public trust pro-
tections. Stockman v. Leddy, 129 P. 220, 222 (Colo. 1912), overruled on other grounds by
United States v. City and Cnty. of Denver, 656 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1982). The court further held
that the public trust is not contained within the Colorado Constitution. People v. Emmert,
597 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Colo. 1979).
39. See, e.g., Stephen H. Leonhardt &JessicaJ. Spuhler, The Public Trust Doctrine: What
It Is, Where It Came From, and Why Colorado Does Not (and Should Not) Have One, 16 U. DENV.
WATER L. REV. 47, 80 (2012) ("PPL Montana lays to rest much of the debate about the
states' ability to define or limit the public trust doctrine."); see also discussion infra note
192.
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believe that reading may go too far.40 The factual context of the
PPL Montana decision could be important to resolving the ques-
tion. In the case, Montana was concerned that the U.S. Supreme
Court would restrict the state's broader definition of public trust to
the narrower, federal navigability test for streambed ownership.4'
The Supreme Court reassured Montana that its state definition,
which includes public recreational access to state waters (including
non-navigable waters), would remain intact. 42 Notably, the Su-
preme Court was not considering a case where a state legislature
had narrowed or eliminated its baseline trust obligations. Nor did
the case involve the question of whether state courts can overrule
such legislative acts, as the Arizona courts have done.43 Thus, it is
unclear whether PPL Montana's pronouncements can be read to
authorize legislative nullification of the public trust.
Richard Frank, writing after the PPL Montana decision, offers a
cogent analysis. 44 He concludes that, even if the public trust doc-
trine's source lies outside of federal law, it nonetheless resides in a
"fundamental, inherent attribute of state sovereignty" that cannot
succumb to state attempts to "limit or eviscerate public trust prin-
ciples."45 Others in the past have similarly argued that the public
trust is an inalienable "attribute of sovereignty" 46 and that public
trust review involves "protection of sovereign rights by courts." 47
Yet another analysis views the public trust doctrine as the function-
al equivalent of the non-delegable duty principle.48 Under any of
these views, even a legislature exercising residual state powers can-
40. See, e.g., infin notes 44-48.
41. PPL Mont., L.L.C. v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1234-35 (2012).
42. Id.. at 1234-35.
43. See discussion in fra Part II.D.
44. Frank, suna note 2, at 686.
45. Id. Wilkinson has similarly reasoned that public trust duties are "an implied con-
dition of statehood," designed to ensure that the important public purposes of the na-
tion's waterways remain safeguarded. Wilkinson, sukra note 1, at 458-60.
46. Jan Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign' Ancient Prerogative Becomes the Pople'
Environ menfal Right, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195, 196, 200, 213-14 (1980).
47. Blumm et al., snprna note 12, at 483; see also TARLOCK, supira note 7, at § 5:59 (rea-
soning that wholesale legislative abdication of the public trust is "inconsistent with" the
requirements in Illinois Cen tial and other cases requiring protection of the public's trust
interest before alienation of trust resources can occur).
48. William D. Araiza, The Public Trit Docriine as an Interpretive Canon, 45 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 693, 706-711 (2012) ("At base, both restrict the alienability of a resource thought
to reside most appropriately with the public as a whole.").
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not disavow its baseline public trust duties.
Adding to the list of possible doctrinal sources, Harrison Dun-
ning suggests that the "most plausible" rationale for treating the
public trust as "beyond-complete legislative control . . . is the idea
that the public trust doctrine . . . has become an implied state con-
stitutional doctrine." 49 Indeed, many state courts have found the
public trust echoed within their state constitutions or grounded in
concepts of state sovereignty. For instance, the South Dakota Su-
preme Court has ruled that although a water use code
displaces common law rules of water use . . . , it does not override
the public trust doctrine or render it superfluous. History and
precedent have established the public trust doctrine as an inher-
ent attribute of sovereign authority. The doctrine exists inde-
pendent of any statute....
Thus, while we regard the public trust doctrine and Water Re-
sources Act as having shared principles, the Act does not sup-
plant the scope of the public trust doctrine.50
Other state courts have ruled similarly. Drawing on both feder-
al public trust principles, as well as unique water resource trust
provisions in its state constitution, Hawaii's supreme court has
concluded that the state's water code "does not supplant" the pub-
lic trust, and that "the doctrine continues to inform the Code's in-
terpretation, define its permissible 'outer limits,' and justify its ex-
istence." 5' In addition to federal law, the North Dakota Supreme
Court and Montana Supreme Court have also looked to their state
constitutions as sources of the public trust.5 2 The Nevada Supreme
Court, citing its state constitution, has held, " [T] he public trust
doctrine is not simply a common law remnant. . . . [It is] inherent
from inseverable restraints on the state's sovereign power."53 The
49. DUNNING, supfra note 18, at § 30.02(d) (3).
50. Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823, 837-38 (S.D. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
51. In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole Ditch), 9 P.3d 409, 448-49 (Haw.
2000) (citing HAW. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 7).
52. Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 167, 170 (Mont.
1984) (citing MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3(3)); United Plainsmen Ass'n v. N.D. State Water
Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457, 461 (N.D. 1976) (citing N.D. CONST. art. XVII, §
210); see alo Rettowski v. Dep't of Ecology, 858 P.2d 232, 232 (Wash. 1993) (citing in part
WASH. CONST. art 17, § 1). See generally Craig, A Comparative Guide, supra note 3 (providing
a comprehensive list of state constitutional provisions).
53. Lawrence v. Clark Cnty., 254 P.3d 606, 612 (Nev. 2011) (citing NEV. CONST. art.
8,§ 9).
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California Supreme Court characterizes the public trust doctrine
as a form of "sovereign supervision"5 4 rooted in the state's "title as
trustee" over state lands and waterways.55 And the Arizona Su-
preme Court cited its constitution when ruling that legislatures
cannot use legislation to "destroy the constitutional limits" of the
public trust. 56
At the end of the day, then, the PPL Montana decision leaves
unresolved an important question about whether all states remain
subject to a public trust baseline, or whether state legislatures can,
under the auspices of federalism, absolve themselves of their trust
duties. If states can disavow their trust duties, then the scope of this
article is necessarily limited to those western states that recognize
the public trust over water. Currently, that list would include all of
the western states except Idaho, Colorado, and potentially Arizo-
na.5 7 If, however, states cannot disavow their trust duties, then the
article's arguments more broadly apply to the private appropria-
tion of water in all western states. Under either scenario, the water
codes of the affected states fail to reflect the modern legal trend of
applying the public trust to water rights.
C. The Modern Trend of Applying the Public Trust to Water Rights
Over the last few decades, courts and legal scholars have begun
noting the strong connection between state public trust responsi-
bilities and water use permitting decisions.58  This "modern
trend" 59 has resulted in judicial directives requiring state agencies
to consider the public trust when new water uses are permitted,
when existing water uses are changed, and, retrospectively, when
existing water uses harm the public trust.60 The following chronol-
54. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709, 728 n.27 (Cal. 1983).
55. Id. at 718. The Ccourt also suggests that Spanish and Mexican law, creating rights
guaranteed by the Treaty of Guadalupe, may provide an independent souLrce of the public
trust doctrine in California. Id. at 719 n.15.
56. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Super. Ct. ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 972 P.2d 179, 199
(Ariz. 1999) (citing ARIZ. CONST. art. 9, § 7); see also discussion itfta Part IID.
57. See discussion supra notes 11 and 38; discussion infra Part II.D. Arizona would be
excluded if its legislature recodifies the public trust provisions previously struck down by
the courts.
58. See stupfra note 2; TARLOCK, stpra note 7, § 5:58 n.2 (listing additional leading ar-
ticles on the public trust doctrine).
59. Craig, A Comparalive Gaide, supra note 3, at 77.
60. TARLOCK, stpra note 7, §§ 5:56-57 ("[T]he public trust may now be a self-
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ogy discusses legal developments in those western states giving rise
to this modern trend. 61
1. Alaska
Alaska's 1959 constitution contains the first explicit statement
of the relationship between public trust principles and water
rights. Article VIII notes that water, fish, and wildlife "are reserved
to the people for common use" and that appropriations of water
are limited by this reservation for fish and wildlife.62 The Alaska
Supreme Court has held that these "common use" rights are a
form of public trust.63 Further, in a 1998 decision involving oil and
gas leasing, the Ccourt acknowledged in passing that the state
holds water rights "in trust for public use," thus paving the way for
future holdings that more explicitly connect the two ideas. 64
2. North Dakota
The North Dakota Supreme Court's 1976 ruling in United
Plainsmen Association v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Commis-
sion is credited as the first judicial decision directly linking the
public trust and water rights.6 5 There, the Ccourt ruled that the
state must consider the public trust before making new appropria-
tions of water. The state's Water Conservation Commission and
State Engineer took a traditional, narrow view of the public trust
by arguing that it applied only to conveyances of real property and
not water rights.66 The Ccourt disagreed, holding that the public
trust doctrine places the state in the "role as trustee of the public
waters," and that the trust, at a minimum, "permits alienation and
allocation of such precious state resources only after an analysis of
present supply and future need." 67 Thus, the State Engineer must
executing judicial or administrative limitation on the acquisition of water rights and the
exercise of existing ones."); DUNNING, supra note 18, § 33.02.
61. Other western states, while recognizing the public trust over waters, are not dis-
cussed here because their jurisprudence has not yet evolved to directly address the public
trust-water rights connection.
62. ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, §§ 3, 13.
63. Pullen v. Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 60-61 (Alaska 1996).
64. Baxley v. Alaska, 958 P.2d 422, 434 (Alaska 1998).
65. United Plainsmen Ass'n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm'n 247 N.W.2d
457, 463 (N.D. 1976).
66. Id. at 461.
67. Id. at 463.
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consider "injury to the public" before granting a use permit.6 8 The
Ccourt also held that "some planning" by water resource agencies
must take place before the states' trust obligation is met,6 9 alt-
hough it did not elaborate on the type of planning required to ful-
fill this trust obligation.
3. Idaho
One year later, the Idaho Supreme Court issued the first in a
series of decisions that recognized the public trust's paramount
role in water use permitting. First, in Ritter v. Standal, the Ccourt
held that a water use permit for a fish farm did not trump the pub-
lic's right of navigability.70 There, the permit holder built a fish
farm on an estuary connected to the Snake River.71 The Ccourt
concluded that the construction illegally interfered with public
ownership of the waters.72 Despite having a water use permit, the
landowner had to "remove the fish farm from the estuary and re-
store the estuary as nearly as practical to its natural condition."7 3
Then in 1983 (on the heels of California's seminal National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court74 decision described below), the
Idaho Supreme Court reiterated that "the public trust doctrine
takes precedent even over vested water rights." 7 In Kootenai Envi-
ronmental Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club, the state supreme court
upheld the state's grant of an encroachment permit to a yacht club
for construction of sailboat slips; however, it held that the "state is
not precluded from determining in the future that this conveyance
is no longer compatible with the public trust imposed on this con-
veyance." 76 And two years later, in the water rights case Shokal v.
Dunn, the Ccourt affirmed in a footnote that " [a]ny grant to use
the state's waters is 'subject to the trust and to action by the State
68. Id. at 464.
69. Id. at 463.
70. Ritter v. Standal, 566 P.2d 769, 773-74 (Idaho 1977).
71. Id. at 770.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Nat'1 Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
75. Kootenai Envtl. Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club, 671 P.2d 1085, 1094 (Idaho
1983) (adopting the reasoning of Nat'lAudubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 722-24).
76. Id.
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necessary to fulfill its trust responsibilities."'"7 As discussed below,
the 1995 Idaho Legislature responded by statutorily nullifying the-
se public trust decisions.78
4. California
In 1983, the California Supreme Court more deeply addressed
the legal connection between the public trust and water rights with
the landmark decision National Audubon Society v. Superior Court,
holding that the public trust doctrine is a limit on water rights and
that private water uses may not "harm the interests protected by
the public trust."79 The Ccourt ruled that the state's duties include
considering impacts to the public trust before approving water us-
es and conditioning uses to "avoid or minimize any harm to those
interests."80 Further, the Ccourt described this responsibility as
ongoing-the state is obligated to modify or curtail the permitted
water use if harm to the trust later occurs. 8' Ultimately, the City of
Los Angeles had to reduce its existing water rights in tributaries of
Mono Lake due to the damaging effects of the lowering lake levels,
which imperiled the ecology of the area.82
California is the only state that has subsequently codified a por-
tion of its public trust mandate into its water permitting regula-
tions. Each issued water permit contains the following standard
language:
Pursuant to . . . the common law public trust doctrine, all rights
and privileges under this permit and under any license issued
pursuant thereto, including method of diversion, method of use,
and quantity of water diverted, are subject to the continuing authority
of the State Water Resources Control Board in accordance with
77. Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 447 n.2 (Idaho 1985) (citing Kootenai Envtl Alli-
ance, 671 P.2d at 1094).
78. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 58-1201-1203 (2012). See discussion infra Part IID.
79. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 712, 727-28 ("This case brings together for the
first time two systems of legal thought: the appropriative water rights system which since
the days of the gold rush has dominated California water law, and the public trust doctrine
. . . ."); see also Craig, A Comparative Guide, supra note 3, at 114 n.336 (listing articles about
the National Audubon Society litigation).
80. Nat's Audubon Socy, 658 P.2d at 712.
81. Id. at 728; see also United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr.
161, 201-02 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (affirming the same).
82. Dave Owen, The Mono Lake Case, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Administrative
State, 45 U.C. DAviS L. REv. 1099, 1103, 1114 (2012).
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law and in the interest of the public welfare to protect public trust uses.83
Under this authority, the State Water Resources Control Board
(SWRCB) can "impos[e] further limitations on the diversion and
use of water by the permittee in order to protect public trust us-
es." 84
While parties protesting an application for water use can raise
public trust concerns,85 there are otherwise no specific procedural
requirements for public trust review in California's water code.86
Importantly, the water code do not expressly require the applicant
or state agency to specifically address public trust impacts in the
absence of a protest.87 This leaves open the possibility that substan-
tial impacts to the trust may occur after a permit issues. Further,
despite the strong limiting language imposed on water use per-
mits, the state does not regularly review water uses after issuing
permits. 88 Thus, while California is a leader in incorporating the
public trust into its water permitting laws, there is still room for
improvement.
5. Washington
Washington case law also suggests a link between the public
trust and water law in that state. In a 1993 water pollution case,
Rettokowski v. Department of Ecology, the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton held that the state's Department of Ecology, which regulates
83. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 780(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
84. d.
85. CAL. CODE REGs. tit. 23, §§ 738, 745(c) (2012).
86. See Owen, supi note 82, at 1143.
87. Despite the lack of a water code requirement for public trust review, Owen doc-
uments that the SWARCB does consider the public tnst in certain instances. Id. at 1130-32
(estimating that the public trust has been mentioned in roughly fifty percent of agency
permitting actions, but served as "a basis for actually taking or requiring some action" in
only twelve percent of agency permitting actions). In part, this level of review is due to in-
dependent environmental review requirements under the California Environmental Qual-
ity Act, although even then there are gaps in coverage between environmental review and
water rights permitting. 1d. at 114346. This ad hoc approach to agency public trust review
does not ensure a consistent level of review in each instance, as public trust law requires. A
better result would be codified review procedures within the state water code.
88. Dave Owen documents that the SWRCB rarely modifies an existing permit, in
part due to lack of adequate funding for monitoring. Owen, supra note 82, at 1117, 1134-
3 5.
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water pollution, was not the agency responsible for protecting wa-
ter uses under the public trust.89 In so holding, the Ccourt noted
in passing that the guiding principles for public trust protection
are found in the state's "Water Code,"90 thus implying that the
state's water rights permitting agency is responsible for the public
trust.
6. Arizona
In 1999, the Arizona Supreme Court struck down legislative at-
tempts to prevent the public trust doctrine from being applied in
state water rights adjudication proceedings. 91 In San Carlos Apache
Tribe v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, the court held that
"[t] he Legislature cannot order the courts to make the doctrine
inapplicable to these or any proceedings. . . . That determination
depends on the facts before a judge, not on a statute. It is for the
courts to decide whether the public trust doctrine is applicable to
the facts." 92 This reasoning lays the foundation for applying the
public trust doctrine to water rights permitting, as well.
7. Hawaii
Hawaii's constitution, which recognizes a unique public trust
over water and other natural resources,93 has played a prominent
role in that state's water rights jurisprudence. In a 2000 decision
commonly known as Waiahole Ditch, the Hawaii Supreme Court
strongly pronounced:
[T]he [Water] Code does not supplant the protections of the
public trust doctrine.
Under the public trust, the state has both the authority and duty
to preserve the rights of present and future generations in the
waters of the state. ... The continuing authority of the state over
its water resources precludes any grant or assertion of vested
rights to use water to the detriment of public trust purposes.
89. Rettokowski v. Dep't of Ecology, 858 P.2d 232, 234 (Wash. 1993).
90. Id. at 239-40.
91. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Super. Ct. ex reL Cnty of Maricopa, 972 P.2d 179, 199
(Ariz. 1999).
92. Id. (emphasis added).
93. HAw. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 7 (adopted in 1978).
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This authority empowers the state to revisit prior diversions and
allocations, even those made with due consideration of their ef-
fect on the public trust. . . .The state also bears an "affirmative
duty to take the public trust into account in the planning and al-
location of water resources, and to protect public trust uses
whenever feasible." 94
Based on this reasoning, the court held that a water rights ap-
plication for a resort development had to be reviewed for public
trust impacts.95 The potential trust impacts included loss of
instream flows for the traditional and customary rights of native
tenants, for ecological purposes, and for domestic drinking water
supply.96 The court ruled that the proposed commercial use, alt-
hough representing an important public interest, was not a pro-
tected trust interest.97 The court also held that additional studies
must occur, at the applicant's expense, before the state Water
Commission could proceed to assess impacts to the public trust.98
8. Montana
Two years later, the Montana Supreme Court began making
connections between water rights and that state's public trust doc-
trine, which extends to all waters capable of recreational use. That
year, the court issued the landmark decision In re Adjudication of the
Dearborn Drainage, allowing parties to claim historic water rights for
non-diversionary, instream flow uses such as recreational uses.99 In
support of its decision, the court noted that, under the state's pub-
lic trust doctrine, the public has enjoyed "an instream, non-
diversionary right to the recreational use of the State's navigable
94. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 445, 453 (Haw. 2000) (citations
omitted) (emphasis in original). The court cited to both National Audubon Society and Koo-
tenai Envinmental Alliance to support its holding. Although the court cited to both the
public trust and a water resources trust unique to Hawaii, it appeared to apply similar re-
quirements to both forms of trust. Id. at 443. Thus, they will be discussed in similar terms
here.
95. Id. at 473-74.
96. Id. at 448-49.
97. Id. at 449-50.
98. Id. at 497.
99. In re Adjudication of the Dearborn Drainage (Dearborn Drainage), 55 P.3d 396,
404 (Mont. 2002) (eliminating the historic requirement that a water right be diverted to
be perfected).
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surface waters" since statehood. 00
Building on this statement, the Montana Supreme Court in
2011 recognized that Montana Trout Unlimited had standing to
participate in the Big Hole River adjudication based on the public
trust and the organization's particularized recreational and fishery
interests.' 0 Despite not having any water rights of its own, the or-
ganization had a right to object to private water rights claims made
in the adjudication because "the [1972 Montana] Constitution
and public trust 'do not permit a private party to interfere with the
public's right to recreational use of the surface of the State's wa-
ters.'" 102
Having already applied the public trust doctrine to water rights
adjudication, the next logical step would be for the court to apply
the doctrine to agency water rights permitting as well. Interesting-
ly, Montana's permitting agency already began grappling with this
question in the 1980s, issuing two decisions that note the possibil-
ity of an agency obligation to consider public trust impacts in water
rights matters, despite the state water code's silence on the sub-
ject. 0 3
9. South Dakota
In 2004, the South Dakota Supreme Court began to outline the
public trust's applicability to water rights in that state. In Parks v.
100. Id. The court also appeared to distance itself from a statement made in dictum
in a 1984 public trust case, wherein it opined that a water rights holder "has no right to
control the use of the surface waters . . . to the exclusion of the public except to the extent of
his fnior approfniatian of part of the water for irrigation purposes, which is not at issue here."
Montana Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 170 (Mont. 1984) (empha-
sis added). In its 2002 decision, the court instead observed that priority dates would de-
termine the competing interests of non-diversionary and diversionary water rights. Dear-
born Drainage, 55 P.3d at 404.
101. Montana Trout Unlimited v. Beaverhead Water Co., 255 P.3d 179, 185-86
(Mont. 2011).
102. Id. at 185 (citing Curran, 682 P.2d at 170).
103. In re Water Use Permit Application 49573-s43B (Carter), Final Order 9-10 (Mont.
Dep't Natural Res. & Conservation Jan. 20, 1986), available at
http://www.dnrc.mt.gov/wrd/water-rts/
hearing_info/hearingorders/casenos_4517249643/049573-4bcarter.pdf; In re Water
Use Permit Application 43104-s76D (Garrison), Proposal for Decision 19-23 (Mont. Dep't
Natural Res. & Conservation Dec. 16, 1987), available at
http://www.dnrc.mt.gov/wrd/water-rts/hearing-info/
hearingorders/case-nos-4213344339/043104-76d-garison.pdf. The agency's final order
adopted this proposed finding. Final Order I (Mont. Dep't Natural Res. & Conservation
Jan. 14, 1988).
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Cooper, the court held that South Dakota's Water Resources Act,
under which the state allocates water use, must embody the princi-
ples of the public trust doctrine.10 4 In that case, the court consid-
ered state ownership and management of certain lake bodies situ-
ated on private land, and whether that ownership included public
recreational use. 05 While the case did not directly implicate a wa-
ter rights application, the court stated that the state Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, which implements the Water
Resources Act, is the agency charged with protecting the public
trust in its management decisions. 0 6
10. Nevada
In the 2011 case Lawrence v. Clark County, the Nevada Supreme
Court recognized the public trust as a doctrine that applies to the
"public land and water" of the state. 0 7 In that case, the litigants
disputed the doctrine's applicability to lands once submerged un-
der the Colorado River. 08 Clark County argued that state legisla-
tion conveying title to the county superseded the public trust. 00
The court disagreed, holding that legislation cannot abrogate the
state's public trust duties."10 Notably, although the case dealt with
submerged lands and not water rights, the court adopted with ap-
proval the following language from a concurring opinion im a pi-
or Nevada water rights case:
This court has itself recognized that this public ownership of wa-
ter is the "most fundamental tenet of Nevada water law." Addi-
tionally, we have noted that those holding vested water rights do
not own or acquire title to water, but merely enjoy a right to the
beneficial use of the water. This right, however, is forever subject
to the public trust, which at all times "forms the outer bounda-
ries of permissible government action with respect to public trust
resources." In this manner, then, the public trust doctrine oper-
ates simultaneously with the system of prior appropriation.
104. Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823, 838 (S.D. 2004).
105. Id. at 828.
106. Id. at 840.
107. Lawrence v. Clark Cnty., 254 P.3d 606, 613 (Nev. 2011).
108. Id. at 607.
109. Id. at 611.
110. Id. at 608, 613.
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If the current law governing the water engineer does not clearly
direct the engineer to continuously consider in the course of his
work the public's interest in Nevada's natural water resources,
then the law is deficient. It is then appropriate, if not our constitu-
tional duty, to expressly reaffirm the engineer's continuing responsibility
as a public trustee to allocate and supervise water rights so that the ap-
propriations do not "substantially impair the public interest in the lands
and waters remaining." "l[T] he public trust is more than an affir-
mation of state power to use public property for public purposes.
It is an affirmation of the duty of the state to protect the people's
common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands,
surrendering that right of protection only in rare cases when the
abandonment of that right is consistent with the purposes of the
trust." Our dwindling natural resources deserve no less."
These ten western states have thus set the West on a bearing
that increasingly recognizes the connection between water rights
and public trust law. Considering that this trend began taking hold
some three decades ago, statutory and regulatory implementation
has lagged inexcusably behind. States that recognize a public trust
over waters must now respond by looking deeply at century-old wa-
ter codes geared toward protecting and maximizing consumptive,
private uses of water.
D. The Mismatch Between Current Water Codes and the Public Trust
Historically in the West, the primary legal concerns when de-
veloping a water right have been whether there is unclaimed water
available to serve the proposed use and whether the proposed use
will injure existing water rights. 1 2 Lawrence MacDonnell aptly
characterized the historic bias of western water law as "100 years of
effort to put every drop of water to some kind of direct human use,
in which water undiverted was water wasted, in which success was
measured by how much water was beneficially consumed."" 3 Un-
der this calculus, private interests are paramount, even to the ex-
111. Id. at 610-11 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (citing Mineral
Cnty. v. Nev. Dep't of Conservation Sc Natural Res., 20 P.3d 800, 808-09 (Nev. 2001) (Rose,
J., concurring)).Justice Rose, who authored the concurrence, relied on Illinois Central, Na-
tional Audubon Society, and Kootenai Environmental Alliance in his reasoning.
112. TARLOCK, supra note 7, § 5:44; see also Owen supra note 82, at 1111 (discussing
these traditional requirements). Similarly, with changes of use the primary inquiry revolves
around harm to existing users. TARLOCK, supra note 7, §§ 5:44, 5:74.
113. Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Environmental lows in the Rocky Mountain West: A Pro-
gress Report, 9 WYo. L. REV. 335, 336 (2009).
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tent of the full appropriation of the entire flow of a stream." 4
Thus, prior appropriation principles can stand in direction tension
with public trust principles that depend upon stream flows for nav-
igation, commerce, fishing, and other state-recognized trust uses.
When western states moved from common law to statutory wa-
ter rights systems, these private user protections carried over into
water codes. At the same time, varying types of public interest pro-
visions were added as well." 5 As discussed below, public interest
provisions originated during an era when private economic devel-
opment was the highest social value, and well before courts began
recognizing a connection to the public trust." 6 Wilkinson has ob-
served that the water permitting agencies applying these code pro-
visions also held a private user bias:
From the beginning, these were captured agencies in the fullest
sense: publicly-funded bodies whose mission was to protect and
promote a limited class of private rights. Despite improvements
in western water administration during the last decade or so, the
interests that created the agencies in the first place, and served as
the agencies' sole constituency, had already locked in well over a
century of private uses. "
Thus, western state water codes and the agencies implementing
114. Owen, supra note 82, at 1111 ("[Wlater users perceived pumping a stream dry
not merely as an allowed outcome, but a desired one."). Many state legislatures have
acknowledged the over-appropriation of waters. Montana, for example, has closed several
basins due to lack of available water. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-231 to -344 (2011). The
Oregon Legislature has also noted an over-allocation of surface waters and a precipitous
decline in groundwater. Michael C. Blumm & Erika Doot, Oregons Public Trust Doctine:
Public Rights in Waters, Wildlif, and Beaches, 42 ENvTL. L. 375, 395 n.135 (citing 2009 Or.
Laws 3237; 3237). And while many western states now recognize and protect non-
consumptive instream flow rights, those rights are limited in their effectiveness because
they do not typically trump senior, consumptive uses. See generally MacDonnell, supra note
113; Jesse A. Boyd, Student Writing, Ilip Deep: A Sueivy of Stale Insireanm Flow Lawfim the
Rocky Montinain.s to the Pacific Ocean, 43 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 1151 (2003) (surveying western
state instream flow laws, and their modest effectiveness).
115. TARLOCK, suprn note 7, §§ 5:51, 5:52. Douglas Grant notes that nearly every
western state requires public interest review for new appropriations, and more than half of
the western states require it for changes of use. Douglas L. Grant, Two Models of Public hter-
esi Review of Waler Allocation in the West, 9 U. DENVER WATER L. REv. 485, 486 nn.1-3 (2006).
116. See discussion infin Part 1I.A.2; Grant, supn/ note 115, at 488, 490, 493 ("The re-
quirement of public interest review of water permit applications dates back in most states
to the period between 1890 and 1920.").
117. E.g., Wilkinson, simna note 1, at 470.
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them were simply not designed to protect the public trust.
Today, these water codes still say little or nothing about the
public trust, require no advance review of trust impacts, and (with
the exception of California) 1 18 make no mention of how the trust
limits water rights. Montana's permit review criteria, for example,
suggest that permits are generally appropriate as long as there is
available water and no adverse effect to prior appropriators. 119 The
criteria do not mention the public trust or require analysis of
stream flows necessary to support the state's public trust uses. Fur-
ther, the state's permitting agency has taken the position that only
state agencies, and not private parties, can object to an application
on the basis of harm to the fishery, thus limiting the public's ability
to defend recreational trust uses. 120 The water codes of other west-
ern states reflect similar permitting preferences and a similar ab-
sence of public trust review.' 2
Should western states fail to update their water codes on behalf
of the public trust, they risk further litigation alleging breaches of
duty to the trust. While the above-discussed states that have explic-
itly recognized a public trust-water rights connection are most vul-
nerable, the remaining states that recognize a trust over waters
face the potential of similar litigation.122 As the next part explains,
in modernizing permitting laws, states should in particular avoid
the temptation of simply relying on existing public interest provi-
sions in their water codes.
118. See discussion infra Part I.C.4. Although Hawaii is attempting to use instream
flow requirements as a proxy for protecting the public trust, its water code also does not
explicitly require trust review as a permit criterion. See infra note 233 and related text.
119. MONT. CODE. ANN. § 85-2-311 (2012).
120. In re Water Use Permit Application No. 49230-s76M (Hanson), Proposal for De-
cision 28 (Mont. Dep't Natural Res. & Conservation Dec. 4, 1984), available at
http://www.dnrc.mt.gov/wrd/water.rts/hearinginfo/hearing._orders/case-nos_4517249
643/049230-76mhanson.pdf (allowing a streambed pipeline to be installed for hydro-
power use and disregarding private objections based on harm to the fishery). The agency's
final order adopted this proposed finding. Final Order 1 (Mont. Dep't Natural Res. &
Conservation Jan. 2, 1985); but see Montana Trout Unlimited v. Beaverhead Water Co., 255
P.3d 179, 185-86 (Mont. 2011) (taking a different position on standing of private parties in
water adjudication proceedings based on the public trust).
121. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-153 (2012) (requiring no "conflicts with vest-
ed rights"); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.370 (2012) (requiring unappropriated water and
no "conflicts with existing rights"); S. D. CODIFIED LAws § 46-2A-9 (2012) (requiring water
availability and no "impairment of existing rights").
122. See, e.g., Blumm & Doot, supra note 114, at 395 (arguing that Oregon's public
trust should similarly extend to water rights).
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II. PUBLIC INTEREST: A FAULTY THREAD IN PUBLIC TRUST LAW
Considering that the public trust's application to water rights
has been one of the most significant developments in trust doc-
trine, the lack of responsive change in state water codes is both
remarkable and troubling. Of particular concern is the prospect of
states equating the public trust with the public interest.'2 3 When
these two concepts are treated interchangeably, states may mistak-
enly assume they can rely on existing public interest provisions in
their water codes to fulfill public trust obligations.'24 Public inter-
est provisions, however, are rife with problems125 and legally un-
suitable to protect the public trust. Most notably, legislatures and
agencies can easily modify public interest outcomes by favoring
various economic or political interests, amending the substantive
and procedural requirements of public interest review, or depriori-
tizing the funding of public interest review. Thus, as a first step in
aligning water codes with the public trust doctrine, it is incumbent
on the judiciary, state legislatures, and state agencies to distinguish
these two legal concepts. In describing this distinction, this part
continues to feature states that have made a public trust-water
rights connection, along with some additional western states that
illustrate the varied uses of public interest review in water use per-
mitting.
123. A couple of scholars have briefly noted the differences between these concepts.
Brian Gray recently expressed concern over the California Supreme Court's use of the
phrase "public interest" when discussing the public trust. Brian E. Gray, Knsuring the Public
Trust, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 973, 982-86 (2012). Reed Benson also characterizes the public
trust and public interest as two separate legal principles. See generally Reed Benson, Public
on Paper: The Fadure of Law to Protect Public Water Uses in the Western United States, 1 INT'LJ.
RURAL L. & POL'Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 9 (2011) (questioning whether either legal approach
adequately protects the public) (on file with author).
124. A few states lack public interest provisions. Montana does not consider the pub-
lic interest for water use unless the use involves out-of-state transfers or quantities exceed-
ing 4,000 annual acre-feet and 5.5 cubic feet per second of water. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-
2-311(3) and (4) (2011). Colorado does not consider the public interest in its judicial sys-
tem of water rights review. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-92-301 to -302 (2012). Oklahoma
once had a public interest provision, but removed it from its permitting criteria in 1963.
Joseph F. Rarick, Oklahoma Water Law, Stream and Sutface Under the 1963 Amendments, 23
OKLA. L. REV. 19, 50 (1970).
125. See discussion infra Part II.C.
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A. Distinctions Between the Public Interest and the Public Trust
Woven into modern public trust law is a faulty thread-a mis-
taken assumption that public trust purposes are synonymous with
public interests and that state agencies considering the public in-
terest are fully protecting the public trust. In reality, these two
concepts are distinct in their legal origin, standard of review, pur-
pose, and scope of coverage.
1. Distinct legal origins and standards of review
The public trust is a duty-based doctrine that requires the state
to protect a delineated set of trust purposes and place those pur-
poses above other private interests.'26 Because courts are the gate-
keepers of the doctrine, they closely scrutinize state actions to en-
sure adequate protection of the public as the beneficiary of the
trust. 127
In contrast, the public interest is a discretionary concept root-
ed in state police powers, and the government may prioritize
among a myriad of interests, receiving broad judicial deference
toward its choices. In 1915, the U.S. Supreme Court described the
sweeping nature of the police powers:
It is to be remembered that we are dealing with one of the most
essential powers of government[] -one that is the least limitable.
It may, indeed, seem harsh in its exercise, usually is on some in-
dividual, but the imperative necessity for its existence precludes
any limitation upon it when not exerted arbitrarily.12 8
This deferential language stands in stark contrast to the more
constrained authority states exercise in public trust decisions. As
an Arizona appellate court aptly summarized:
Just as private trustees are judicially accountable to their benefi-
ciaries for dispositions of the res, so the legislative and executive
branches are judicially accountable for their dispositions of the
public trust .... .The check and balance ofjudicial review provides
a level of protection against improvident dissipation of an irre-
126. See discussion supra Part IA and related notes 12-28.
127. See discussion supra Part I.A; see also Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 470 ("[At the
time of Illinois Central], as now, judges can be expected to employ old and honored no-
tions of trusteeship in order to fulfill the interests and expectations of the public.").
128. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915).
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placeable res ....
Final determination whether the alienation or impairment of a
public trust resource violates the public trust doctrine will be
made by the judiciary. This is not to say that this court will [sub-
stitutel its judgment for that of the legislature or agency. Howev-
er, it does mean that this court will take a "close look" at the ac-
tion to determine if it complies with the public trust doctrine and
it will not act merely as a rubber stamp for agency or legislative
action. 129
The state might sell ordinary property for fair consideration for
the public purpose of enhancing the state fisc. Such a showing,
however, would not suffice to validate a dispensation from the
public trust. Because the state may not dispose of trust resources
except for purposes consistent with the public's right of use and
enjoyment of those resources, any public trust dispensation must
also satisfy the state's special obligation to maintain the trust for
the use and enjoyment of present and future generations. 130
The Washington Supreme Court similarly announced that
"courts review legislation under the public trust doctrine with a
heightened degree of judicial scrutiny, 'as if they were measuring
that legislation against constitutional protections."' 131 And in
Waiahole Ditch, the Hawaii Supreme Court further distinguished
generalized police powers from the public trust:
The State unquestionably has the power to accomplish much of
[its administration of waters] through its police powers. We be-
lieve however that the king's reservation of his sovereign preroga-
tives respecting water constituted much more than restatement of
police powers, rather we find that it retained on behalf of the
people an interest in the waters of the kingdom which the State
has an obligation to enforce and which necessarily limited the
129. Ariz. Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 168-69 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1991) (citing Kootenai Envtl. Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club, 671 P.2d 1085, 1092
(Idaho 1983)) (involving legislative relinquishment of title in riverbed lands and asserting
that "court[s] will subject legislative dispensations of state natural resource holdings to a
'high and demanding' standard of review"); Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 607
(Me.1981)) (other citations omitted).
130. Id. at 170.
131. Weden v. San Juan Cnty., 958 P.2d 273, 283 (Wash. 1998) (quoting Ralph W.
Johnson et al., The Public Tr.ust Docitine and Coasal Zome Management in Washington State, 67
WASH. L. REv. 521, 525-27 (1992)).
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creation of certain private interests in waters. 32
The broad discretion attendant with state police powers be-
comes broader still when considering that legislatures have dele-
gated to agencies the ultimate question of what constitutes the
"public interest." 3 3 Depending on the specificity of a public inter-
est statute, an agency may use rulemaking to define what the term
"public interest" means, and, in specific matters, weigh the evidence
and ultimately decide under the facts what actions promote the
public interest. These determinations are ordinarily subject to ju-
dicial deference under administrative law, 134 and thus are not sub-
jected to the more rigorous judicial scrutiny called for under the
public trust doctrine.
2. Distinct purposes and scope
As if legal origin and standard of review were not enough to
differentiate the concepts of public interest and public trust, the
purpose and scope of the two concepts provide yet further distinc-
tions. The public trust covers the traditional uses of navigation,
commerce, and fishing,'35 along with those additional, unique
purposes that a state has recognized as part of its trust.'36 Regard-
less of the public trust's scope in a particular state, the law intends
to insulate the trust corpus from the vagaries of changing legisla-
tive and agency prerogatives.
The scope of the public interest, on the other hand, is intend-
ed to be far-ranging, highly discretionary, and responsive to chang-
ing political, economic, and social priorities. As the legislative
machinations of Illinois Central illustrate, political priorities and
132. In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole Ditch), 9 P.3d 409, 441 (Haw.
2000) (citations and original emphasis omitted).
133. Grant, sup/ra note 115, at 487 (observing that "important specifics about the
function and scope of public interest review" are determined by the permitting agency);
see also, e.g., Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Washoe Cnty., 918 P.2d 697, 700 (Nev.
1996) (citations omitted) (holding that because the State Engineer is charged with admin-
istering Nevada's water appropriation statutes, that person is also "impliedly clothed with
power to construe [them] as a necessary precedent to administrative action").
134. KOCHJR., sura note 28, §§ 11:22, 11:33; see also, eg., Iramid Lake Paiute Tribe,
918 P.2d at 700, 702 (citations omitted) ("'[G]reat deference should be given to the [ad-
ministrative] agency's interpretation when it is within the language of the statute.' . . .
Moreover, as a general rule, a decision of an administrative agency will not be disturbed
unless it is arbitrary and capricious.").
135. See supra note 36.
136. See supra notes 34-37 and related text.
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trust purposes can occupy entirely different spheres.
Moreover, historical evidence does not reveal a connection be-
tween the public trust and public interest provisions in state water
codes. Douglas Grant observes that "public interest review of water
permit applications dates back in most states to the period between
1890 and 1920,"'13 well before the recent era of connecting the
public trust and water rights.
The driving purpose behind public interest review was to help
state agencies decide between competing proposals for water use
based on which proposal most benefits the public interest' 38-a
phrase that Grant characterizes as "vacuous" and "bog [ged] down
in ambiguity and subjectivity." 39 Indeed, throughout much of
western water law, agency officials (and reviewing courts) have re-
lied on "unwritten public policy" to equate public interest with
"maximum economic development."o40 Grant notes that several
courts have not only sanctioned, but have gone so far as to require
that public interest review "maximize economic benefits from the
water resource."
As a classic example, the Wyoming State Engineer in 1908 used
public interest review to limit a hydroelectric power generation
permit so that it would not interfere with "economically more val-
uable mineral development in the region." 42 In 1943, the Utah
State Engineer similarly used the state's "public welfare" provision
to choose between competing proposals. A larger proposal to
transfer the waters of several rivers out of their basins for munici-
pal, irrigation, and industrial supply prevailed over a smaller hy-
dropower proposal involving only the Provo River because the
larger proposal was perceived to have broader economic bene-
fits. 4 3 In these and countless other instances, state agencies have
137. Grant, supa note 115, at 488.
138. Id. at 506.
139. Id. at 487, 491.
140. Id. at 490, 493.
141. Id. at 493 & n.38.
142. Id. at 492-93 & n.37 (discussing Big Horn Power Co. v. State, 148 P. 1110, 1112-
13 (Wyo. 1915)). Wyoming has an undefined, open-ended public welfare requirement.
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-503 (2012).
143. Tanner v. Bacon, 136 P.2d 957, 959-60, 963-64 (Utah 1943) (citing 1919 Utah
Laws ch. 67, §10 (current version at UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-8(1)(b) (2012))); see also
Grant, surna note 115, at 494 (discussing the case).
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resolved the question of public interest based on economic, social,
and political priorities falling outside the scope of the public
trust. 144
B. Judicial Confusion of the Concepts
Based on the clear legal distinctions between the public trust
and the public interest, it is disconcerting that courts have used
the terms interchangeably and inconsistently, even citing public
interest provisions in state water codes as indicators of the public
trust.145 Until the judiciary better clarifies these distinctions, there
is little incentive for legislatures and agencies to modify water
permitting practices and great incentive for them to simply apply
existing public interest review.
For example, in Waiahole Ditch, the Hawaii Supreme Court
commingled public trust principles with the public interests listed
in the Hawaii Water Code.'4 6 Although the code's public interest
provision lists non-trust uses such as irrigation, power develop-
ment, commercial, and industrial uses, the court nonetheless de-
clared that the provision "generally mirrors the public trust prin-
ciples." 4 7 Later, the court used the phrase "public interest" again
in a slightly different way to promote non-trust interests, ruling
that "the Commission must duly consider the significant public in-
terest in continuing reasonable and beneficial existing offstream uses." 148
Later still, the court stated: " [T]he criterion of 'consistent with the
public interest' demand [s] examination of . .. public and private
uses. . . ."149 The court's use of imprecise language thus leaves the
false impression that the two concepts are synonymous.
In Shokal, the Idaho Supreme Court created confusion by stat-
ing in a footnote that Idaho's statutory public interest provision is
"related to the larger doctrine of the public trust," without ex-
144. Grant, supra note 115, at 493 & n.38; see also discussion infra Part ILC (providing
additional examples).
145. As Gray observes, even when the courts do not expressly cite to statutory public
interest provisions, they by implication suggest that "the public trust is little more than a
reiteration" of such provisions. Gray, supra note 123, at 983.
146. HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-2 (2012).
147. In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole Ditch), 9 P.3d 409, 457 (Haw.
2000). Hawaiian trust purposes include instream flows for ecological purposes, native tra-
ditional and customary rights, and domestic drinking water. See supra notes 96-97 and re-
lated text.
148. Id. at 462 (emphasis added).
149. Id. at 473 (emphasis added).
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plaining the relationship. 50 The North Dakota Supreme Court al-
so cited to that state's public interest provision when holding that
the State Engineer, "consistent with the public interest," must de-
termine impacts on the public trust.'5 ' And in Lawrence, the Neva-
da Supreme Court, when discussing "public trust purposes," im-
precisely observed that "when the Legislature has found that a
given dispensation is in the public's interest, it will be afforded def-
erence." 152
The South Dakota Supreme Court created similar confusion
when it held that the state is obliged to protect the public trust, but
also stated that the legislature must consider "public interest" and
the "best use of these public waters in the interest of the 'general
health, welfare and safety of the people."1 5 3 And California's Na-
tional Audubon Society decision discussed the state's "power to allo-
cate water resources in the public interest," while also holding that
water allocation decisions must be based on the "effect on the
public trust." 5 4 Brian Gray's observation about that decision could
apply to nearly all state court decisions discussing the public trust:
"Although it is unlikely that the supreme court intended to create
this array of inconsistent standards for effectuating the public
trust, the court's failure to articulate a single standard (or at least a
cohesive set of standards) was confusing and threatened to dimin-
ish the public trust." 15
In the context of public trust jurisprudence, the fairest and
most accurate reading of the judiciary's use of "public interest"
must be as a public trust interest or public ownership interest in the
trust. This reading is supported by the U.S. Supreme Court's char-
acterization of "public interest" in Illinois Central, wherein it used
the phrase "public interest in the lands and waters remaining" to de-
scribe the public's legally protected interest in trust resources. 156 In
National Audubon Society, the California Supreme Court used simi-
lar phrasing when it required the state to protect "the public in-
150. Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 447 n.2 (Idaho 1985).
151. United Plainsmen Ass'n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Conm'n, 247 N.W.2d
457, 462 (N.D. 1976).
152. Lawrence v. Clark Cnty., 254 P.3d 606, 616-17 (Nev. 2011) (emphasis added).
153. Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823, 841 (S.D. 2004).
154. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709, 728 (Cal. 1983).
155. Gray, supra note 123, at 985.
156. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453-54 (1892) (emphasis added).
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terest in the trust res." 157
To ensure accuracy in public trust jurisprudence, courts must
be far more precise in their use of public interest and public trust
terminology. When courts suggest that public interest statutes are a
vehicle for considering the public trust, the appropriate reading of
those judicial statements must be one where the public trust over-
lays and defines the outer limits of those statutes. 15 8 If courts blur
trust doctrine with legislative public interest prerogatives, they will
relinquish their role as ultimate gatekeeper of the public trust. As
discussed next, the risks of deferring to such public interest pre-
rogatives are simply too great.
C. Opening the Door to All Manner of "Public" Interests
When courts imply that statutory public interest provisions can
stand in for public trust review, they open the door to any number
of public interest justifications offered by legislatures and the ad-
ministrative agencies that implement water use permitting. As Gray
concludes, under such an approach "the public trust is subsumed
within the wide-ranging and amorphous public interest stand-
ard."159 The checkered history of public interest provisions reveals
some common concerns, including public interest statutes that
lack definition, far-ranging public interest lists that include non-
trust purposes, and public interest priority statements that priori-
tize non-trust purposes.
1. Open-ended public interest provisions
Several state .water codes use the phrase "public interest,"
"public purpose," or "public welfare" without defining the term.
Nevada provides one example. There, the water code simply states
that the State Engineer "shall reject the application and refuse to
issue the requested permit" if the application "threatens to prove
detrimental to the public interest."160 This lack of definition sig-
nals that the legislature delegated the authority to define public in-
157. Nat'lAudubon Socy, 658 P.2d at 719 (emphasis added).
158. See, eg., In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole Ditch), 9 P.3d 409, 445
(Haw. 2000) ("[T]he doctrine continues to inform the Code's interpretation, define its
permissible 'outer limits,' and justify its existence."); see also discussion supra Part II.A.2.
159. Gray, supra note 123, at 983. Benson also critiques public interest provisions for
their vagueness, highly discretionary nature, and lack of explanation regarding how to
weigh or balance factors. Benson, supra note 123, at 9-10.
160. NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 533.370(2) (2012).
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terest to the State Engineer."' In adopting a definition, the State
Engineer reviewed the state water code and pulled out thirteen
public policy objectives adopted by the Nevada Legislature. 6 2
Many of the objectives promote private interests, and none ex-
pressly address the public trust. Nor are the objectives weighted to
prioritize those policies most important to the public trust. 63 Sev-
eral of the public policies selected by the State Engineer also re-
state traditional prior appropriation requirements such as benefi-
cial use, no waste, and no injury to other users. 164 This, too, is
problematic because it perpetuates the water code's historic bias in
favor of private use, thereby elevating water rights above the public
trust. The public trust should be held out as a "far higher stand-
ard" than traditional water rights principles, which are designed
for the convenience of private users.'6 5
In other states with open-ended public interest provisions, state
engineers have simply considered whatever public interests they
deemed relevant to the permitting decision. For example, in South
Dakota, the reviewing agency states that public interest "is a de-
termination made by the [agency] based on testimony at the time
of hearing." 166
Grant observes that up until the 1960s, western state agencies
161. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Washoe Cnty., 918 P.2d 697, 698-700
(Nev. 1996).
162. Id. at 698-99 (citing Supplemental Rulings 3786A and 3787A). Grant terms this
the "other-laws model" of public interest review, when the agency looks to other laws
where the legislature has articulated public policy to create a list of public interest issues.
Grant, sulna note 115, at 489. Under this model, only codified public interests are consid-
ered, thus limiting the ability to consider other, uncodified interests that fall within the
public trust.
163. Grant, supra note 115, at 489.
164. As proof that Nevada's public interest essentially replicates traditional appropri-
ative principles, the Nevada State Engineer has used public interest review to deny applica-
tions that lack beneficial use, proper places of use, water availability, or due diligence or
that contain other technical deficiencies. Amber Weeks, Defining the Public Interest: Adrnini,-
trative Nariowving and Anoadening of the Pubic Interest in Respionse to the Statittany Silence of Water
Codes, 50 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 255, 264-70 (2010) (citing several case studies).
165. Cynthia L. Koehler, Water Rights and the Public Trust Doctrine: Resolution of the
Mono Lake Controveersy, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 541, 567 (1995).
166. S.D. DEP'T OF ENVTL. & NATURAL RES., WATER MGMT. BD., Sum mary of South Da-
kota Rules and Laws, http://denr-.sd.gov/des/wr/surmmary.aspx#Criteria (last accessed Apr.
21, 2013). Arizona is another state that has an open-ended provision requiring denial of
permits when they are "against the interests and welfare of the public." ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 45-153(A) (2013).
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and courts employing this open-ended approach had a "prevailing
ethic" that favored economic development. 67 Between two com-
peting water proposals, the one that provided the most economic
benefits would be permitted.16 8 Washington's public interest review
explicitly codifies this ethic, requiring that due regard be given to
the "highest feasible development of the use of the waters." 169
To illustrate how wide-ranging public interest can be, Grant
cites several examples of political, economic, and social values that
have fallen within the purview of the "public interest," including:
* Odors from a proposed hog farm application;
* Potential flood damage to neighboring property;
* Impacts to local agrarian culture from a proposed lake
resort;
* Job creation and impacts to tourism;
* Impacts to mining ventures;
* Impacts on property values; and
* Compatibility with local zoning and planning ordinanc-
es. 170
Clearly, then, a wide variety of interests can qualify as public in-
terests-interests that have little or no bearing on the public's
right to navigate, conduct commerce, and fish on public water-
ways. 171
167. Grant, su/pra note 115, at 490.
168. See, e.g., discussion supra Part II.A.2 (discussing Wyoming and Utah as exam-
ples). Grant terms this the "maximization model" of public interest review, where the
agency "can look to unwritten public policy for guidance." Grant, supra note 115, at 489.
Under this model, there is no limit to the types of public interest that the agency can con-
sider, and it may choose to emphasize other interests that fall outside the public trust.
169. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.03.290 (2012).
170. Grant, supra note 115, at 492-93, 498-503, 513 (discussing examples from Utah,
Wyoming, New Mexico, Washington, South Dakota, Idaho, and Nevada).
171. There is also the related question of who is the "public" in public interest pro-
visions, with some legislatures and courts concluding that the protected group is the local
community living near the proposed water use, rather than the general public. Id. at 499-
502, 514 (discussing Idaho's former "local public interest" statute and a New Mexico trial
court decision that focused on local agrarian culture). This, of course, is a different popu-
lation segment than the general public protected in rights of navigation, commerce, and
fishing on a water body.
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2. Public interest laundiy lists
In a few instances, state legislatures have defined public inter-
est through a list of items or factors that may. be considered. Alt-
hough some listed items may overlap with public trust purposes,
the list is not guaranteed to be coterminous. Indeed, it is more
likely to sweep in a variety of public considerations that are beyond
the scope of the public trust. For example, the Kansas Legislature
ends its public interest list with a sweeping catchall that instructs
the agency to consider the existing claims of "all persons to use the
water" and "all other matters pertaining to" the public interest. 172
Moreover, to the extent public trust purposes are included
within public interest lists, those trust purposes are relegated to be-
ing just another factor in a long list of competing interests.'7 3 In
Hawaii, for example, where commercial activities are not a pro-
tected trust purpose, 74 its water code declares irrigation, power
development, commercial, and industrial uses as important "pub-
lic interests" alongside other uses more consistent with the public
trust.'75 Oregon, in turn, cites a list of beneficial uses that includes
navigation but also irrigation, mining, industrial purposes, "or any
other beneficial use to which the water may be applied for which it
may have a special value to the public." 7 6 Oregon also lists "max-
imum economic development of the waters involved" as an im-
portant public interest. 77
Similar observations apply to Alaska's public interest statute,
which lists eight separate items that should be considered, includ-
ing "benefit to the applicant." 78 Arguably, only two of the eight
listed items relate to Alaska's public trust: "the effect on fish and
172. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-711(b) (2012).
173. Gray, supra note 123, at 983 (observing that equating public trust with pub-
lic interest "suggests that the public trust is simply one of a multiplicity of factors that must
be considered, and somehow balanced, in decisions that allocate the rights to use the
state's water resources-factors that include the entire array of consumptive and
nonconsumptive uses") Gray also observes that when the courts speak in terms of cost-
benefit analyses or balancing of interests, they "risk blending the public trust into a broad
pool of [water] allocation factors." Id. at 984.
174. In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole Ditch), 9 P.3d 409, 450 (Haw.
2000).
175. HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-2(c) (2012).
176. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 537.170(8) (2012),.
177. Id.
178. ALASKASTAT.ANN. § 46.15.080(b) (2012).
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game resources and on recreational opportunities" and "the effect
upon access to navigable waters.""17 North Dakota also considers
recreation and fishery impacts as merely one consideration along-
side non-trust interests like the "effect of the economic activity re-
sulting from the proposed appropriation."18 0 And Montana has a
"public welfare" requirement for larger appropriations that lists
"minimum streamflows" as a consideration alongside non-trust
topics such as effects on private property rights and existing water
users.181
Thus, to the extent public trust uses are included among the
many public interests recognized by a state, those trust uses are
weighted the same as all non-trust interests. This result under-
mines the paramount nature of the public trust and creates oppor-
tunities for trust purposes to be demoted in legal significance.
3. Prioritized public interests
A final variation is the legislative prioritizing of uses to deter-
mine which proposed use best promotes the "public interest."
This type of legislation was the impetus behind the National Audu-
bon Society litigation. There, the state permitting agency looked to a
California prioritizing statute that stated "domestic use is the
highest use."182 Based on that instruction, the agency erroneously
concluded that the water diversions from Mono Lake to Los Ange-
les were in the public interest and could not be modified to pro-
tect the Lake's habitat. 183
Many states have similar statutory priority statements indicating
that certain private, consumptive uses are a high public priority.
Utah, for example, identifies "irrigation, domestic or culinary,
stock watering, power or mining development, or manufacturing"
as the highest beneficial uses.184 Wyoming lists "water for drinking
purposes for both man and beast," "municipal purposes," and
"water for the use of steam engines and for general railway use" as
top priorities.185 These types of provisions hearken back to a time
179. Id. § 46.15.080(b).
180. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 61-04-06 (2012).
181. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-311(3), (4) (2011) (applying to quantities exceeding
4,000 annual acre-feet and 5.5 cubic feet per second of water).
182. Currently codified at CAL. WATER CODE § 1254 (2012).
183. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709, 713-14 (Cal. 1983).
184. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-8(1) (b) (i) (2012).
185. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-102 (2012).
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before the public trust became central to water rights permitting
and run counter to Illinois Central's mandate that trust resources be
protected above private interests.
Ultimately, regardless of how a state interprets and applies its
public interest provisions, there is little assurance that those provi-
sions will protect the public trust. Indeed, scholars question
whether such provisions have had any impact on permitting deci-
sions in general. As Reed Benson has observed, "There is no indi-
cation that public interest provisions have caused the western
states to deny permits or transfers they would otherwise have ap-
proved." 186
D. Opening the Door to Legislative Abrogation of the Trust
Just as the political composition of a legislature can and does
change, so too can dramatic shifts occur in public interest priori-
ties. Arizona provides an example of this phenomenon. In re-
sponse to Arizona officials asserting state title over riverbeds, the
state legislature in 1987 passed a law relinquishing state interests in
those riverbeds to private ownership, without conducting a particu-
larized assessment of public trust impacts.187 During the litigation
that ensued, the Attorneys General of California, Nevada, Idaho,
Washington, North Dakota, Utah, New Mexico, and Alaska filed
amicus curiae briefs challenging the legality of Arizona's legisla-
tion. i88
On review, the state court of appeals acknowledged that the
legislature had a legitimate public purpose for its actions-namely,
clearing up ambiguities in record title over extensive amounts of
land in the state. 89 The interest in clearing title so that real estate
markets can function properly is a public interest well within the
186. Benson, supra note 123, at 10 (noting the "absence of any reported judicial de-
cision reviewing a denial based solely or primarily" on the public interest).
187. 1987 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 127 (currently codified at ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-
1101 to 1108, 12-510, 12-529 (2012)) [hereinafter H.B. 2017]. The exception is lands be-
neath the Colorado River. For a discussion of the events leading up to H.B. 2017, see also
Ariz. Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 161-63 (Ariz. Ct: App. 1991).
In the prior session, the Legislature passed a similar bill that was vetoed by Governor
Bruce Babbitt. Id. at 162 n.1.
188. Hassel, 837 P.2d. at 163.
189. (/. at 164.
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government's police powers. 90 Nonetheless, the court invalidated
the law, holding that the legislature had not met its heightened
public trust obligations when alienating the state's interest in trust
property. Citing Illinois Central, the court noted that the public
trust is paramount over legislative acts: " [T] he state's responsibility
to administer its watercourse lands for the public benefit is an
inabrogable attribute of statehood itself."' 9 ' The Arizona Legisla-
ture made subsequent attempts to limit the public trust, but these
statutes were also struck down by the. courts as impermissible at-
tempts to alienate the state's public trust duties.'92
As described in Part I, the Idaho Supreme Court in the 1980s
made important pronouncements concerning water rights and the
public trust.19 3 In subsequent years political control of the Idaho
Legislature shifted, and the 1995 legislature responded to the
court's public trust rulings with H.B. 794,194 the "Public Trust
Elimination" Bill. 95 This legislation, adopted late in the session
with little public process,196 altered the scope of the public trust in
Idaho in two important ways: (1) by narrowing the types of re-
sources included in the public trust; and (2) by enlarging the rea-
sons that public trust resources can be alienated to private inter-
ests. 97 The first change limited the public trust solely to the beds
underlying navigable waters and expressly excluded "water or wa-
ter rights" from the trust. 98 The second change opened up the
190. Id. (citing Opinion of the justices, 437A.2d 597, 607 (Me. 1981)).
191. Id. at 168 (requiring that the state make particularized assessments about public
trust impacts before alienating riverbed ownership).
192. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Super. Ct. ex reL Cnty. of Maricopa, 972 P.2d 179,
199 (Ariz. 1999) (attempting to preclude the public trust in state adjudications); Defend-
ers of Wildlife v. Hull, 18 P.3d 722, 738 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (attempting once again to
alienate streambed ownership without a particularized assessment). Craig posits, "After
PP'L Montana, is the Arizona legislature now free to rid Arizona of its public trust doc-
trine?" ROBERT W. ADLER, ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG & NOAH D. HALL, MODERN WATER LAW:
PRIVATE PROPERTY, PUBLIC RIGHTS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 11 (forthcoming
2013); see also Leonhardt & Spuhler, supra note 39, at 68 (asserting that the answer to
Craig's question is "yes").
193. See supra notes 70-78 and related discussion Part I.C.3.
194. 1996 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 342 (currently codified at Idaho Code Ann. § 58-1201
to -1203 (2012)). For an in-depth discussion and critique of this legislation, see generally
Blumm et al., supra note 12.
195. Blumm et al., supra note 12, at 472 (citing an Idaho Conservation League press
release).
196. Id. at 472-73.
197. Id. at 473-74.
198. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 58-1203(1), (2) (b) (2012).
[Vol. 32:283320
HITCHING OUR WAGON TO A DIM STAR
reasons for alienating beds of navigable waters to include non-trust
purposes such as "agriculture, mining, forestry, or other uses." 199
The Idaho Legislature's actions undoubtedly compromised
baseline public trust requirements. 200 First, the legislature alienat-
ed an entire category of public trust resources without making a
determination of impacts to the public trust. Second, the legisla-
ture subordinated the public trust below other, private interests
without any justification for doing so. The legislature also left those
private interests open-ended with its "or other uses" language,
suggesting, again, that a myriad of possible political agendas can
be used to justify alienation of the public trust.
Interestingly, subsequent to H.B. 794's enactment, the Idaho
Supreme Court continues to cite its previous public trust holdings
without expressly addressing H.B. 794. In 2009, for example, in a
trust case involving title to lands under navigable waters, the court
stated: "We have-also addressed the right of the public to the use
of navigable waters.. . . This public use and benefit includes naviga-
tion, fish and wildlife habitat, recreation, aesthetic beauty, and wa-
ter quality."201 Although H.B. 794 has not yet been directly chal-
lenged, this recent holding may signal the state court's
unwillingness to recognize legislative curtailment of the public
trust.
As discussed in Part I, one possible reading of PPL Montana
would suggest that state legislatures can indeed eliminate state
public trust responsibilities as the legislatures of Arizona and Idaho
have attempted to do.202 Another possible reading of the case,
however, would support a minimal public trust baseline that state
legislatures simply cannot ignore. 203 Regardless of how the ques-
tion is ultimately resolved, these examples illustrate that the public
trust is indeed a target of political interests. Thus, if the public
trust is relegated to a mere statutory public interest test, it is all the
more vulnerable to legislative abrogation. 204
199. Id. at § 58-1203(3) (emphasis added).
200. See Blumm et al., suita note 12, at 494-96.
201. Mesenbrink v. Hosterman, 210 P.3d 516, 518 (Idaho 2009) (emphasis added).
Notably, the court continues to cite Koolenai EnvinmmntlAliance
202. See discussion suprra Part I.B.
203. See discussion sufna Part I.B.
204. See discussion spra Part II.A.1 (contrasting the broad police powers to define
public interest with the narrow trustee powers related to public trust).
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E. Opening the Door to Procedural Displacement of the Trust
When the public trust is treated as coterminous with the public
interest, there is an additional risk that legislatures will modify
procedural requirements to the detriment of the public trust. As
noted in Part I, the state has an independent duty to review the al-
ienation of public trust resources for impacts on trust purposes. To
be procedurally proper, this review should occur before the trans-
fer of water interests to private parties,205 which means that the ap-
plicant should address public trust impacts at the time of applica-
tion.
While some state courts have directly addressed this procedural
burden, state water codes have not been modified to comply with
these judicial directives. For example, the Hawaii Supreme Court
has held: "Under the public trust and the Code, permit applicants
have the burden of justifying their proposed uses in light of pro-
tected public rights in the resource. ... [T]he public trust effec-
tively creates this burden through its inherent presumption in fa-
vor of public use, access, and enjoyment." 206 Nonetheless, the
Hawaii Water Code does not mention the public trust among the
items an applicant must address. 20 7 The Idaho Supreme Court also
explicitly held that the applicant bears the burden on public trust
issues,208 although that requirement remains uncertain due to sub-
sequent law purporting to remove water rights from the public
trust. 209
By failing to address the issue of advance public trust review,
states may de facto shift that burden onto the public itself. For ex-
ample, California, the only state that mentions the public trust in
its water use permitting procedures, does not explicitly require ad-
vance public trust review in its water code. The reviewing agency
may consider trust impacts sua sponte,210 or an objector may raise
205. See discussion supra Part I.A.
206. In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole Ditch), 9 P.3d 409, 472 (Haw.
2000).
207. HAw. REV. STAT. § 174C-49 (2012). Note, however, that the state is attempting
to address some public trust issues indirectly through its instream flow program, which is
in progress. See infra note 233 and related text. This indirect route is arguably less robust
than having explicit trust requirements in the application process.
208. Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 450 (Idaho 1985).
209. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-202 (2012); see abo discussion supra Part II.D.
210. Owen, however, points out that environmental review under CEQA allows an
opportunity for advance public trust review. See Owen, supra note 82, at 1143. Again, this
indirect route is arguably less robust than having explicit trust requirements in the applica-
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those concerns.21' Absent an objection, however, the regulations
do not impose on the agency an independent duty to consider the
trust. At the tail end of review, the agency simply requires (which is
admittedly more than other states require) that the issued permit
expressly state that it is subject to the public trust.2 12 Under these
procedures, public trust resources may be privately used in ways
later discovered to substantially impair the trust.2 1 3 The burden is
thus placed on the public trust beneficiaries as objectors, rather
than the state as trustee, to step forward and protect trust re-
sources. This burden becomes all the greater when considering
that California lacks the funding to routinely monitor and modify
water uses that may be harming the public trust. 2 14
In the absence of any legislative guidance, Montana's permit-
ting agency has improperly concluded that objectors carry the
burden of proving harm to the public trust,215 thus leaving private
parties, rather than the state, with the task of collecting sufficient
data to analyze impacts to instream flows. Noting that Montana wa-
ter law is unclear about whether public trust issues can be consid-
ered during permitting,21 6 the agency has held:
[Iff trust issues are to be raised at all, the necessary inference is
that they must be raised by the other parties to the matter. Fur-
ther, because trust issues are not germane to proof of the enu-
merated [permit review] criteria, they would have to be affirma-
tively raised in advance of the hearing in order to provide proper
tion process. Indeed, the numbers bear this out. Id.; see also supra note 87 (discussing the
modest percentage of decisions mentioning the public trust and an even lesser percentage
where the trust played a role in the decision).
211. CAL. CODE RECs. tit. 23, §§ 738, 745(c) (2012) (allowing the public to protest an
application based on trust impacts).
212. Id.at§780(a).
213. Discovery itself depends on proper monitoring, which, as noted in Part IIF, in-
fin, is vulnerable to legislative defunding decisions that can erode public trust protection.
214. In California, the permitting agency is underftnded and its "investigation and
enforcement resources" have been too inadequate to meaningfully review existing water
rights for trust impacts. Owen, sufna note 82, at 1117 & n. 111.
215. Water Use Permit Application 43104-s76D (Garrion), Proposal for Decision 21-
22 (Mont. Dep't Natural Res. & Conservation Dec. 16, 1987), available at
http://www.dnrc.mt.gov/
wrd/water-_rts/hearinginfo/hearing_orders/case-nos_4213344339/043104-
76dgarrison.pdf. The agency's final order adopted this proposed finding. Final Order I
(Mont. Dep't Natural Res. & ConservationJan. 14, 1988).
216. See infm notes 229-31 and related text.
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notice that they are at issue, and the party seeking dismissal [of
the application], because he is raising a claim independent of the
criteria, would "bear the burden of persuasion . .1. 217
In that administrative matter, captioned In re Water Use Permit Appli-
cation 43104-s76D (Garrison), the agency proceeded to disregard
the public trust issues because the objectors were unable to pro-
vide hard evidence that reduced water levels would harm recrea-
tional uses that had historically occurred on the impacted wa-
ters.218 Ultimately, while such burden shifting may be appropriate
for ordinary statutory review criteria such as public interest review,
it is inappropriate where the state serves as trustee over public re-
sources.
Along with improper application processes and misplaced bur-
dens of proof, there are commensurate concerns with the stand-
ards of review on appeal. If the public trust is simply folded into
public interest review, there is a risk that courts will extend too
much deference to agency decisions affecting the trust corpus. Cal-
ifornia courts, for example, have mistakenly held that both legisla-
tive and adjudicative actions of the permitting agency receive or-
dinary agency deference, despite the fact that permitting actions
implicate the public trust.219 While ordinary agency deference is
appropriate for public interest review, it falls far short of Illinois
Central's mandate for strong judicial scrutiny of state decisions af-
fecting the public trust. 2 20 As Justice Ronald Robie has expressed,
the standard of review is probably "the most important limitation"
on the courts' power to protect trust values, and "the deference
mandated by the standard of review necessarily restricts the court's
power to impose its own judgment." 221
F. Opening the Door to Financial Constraints on Trust Protection
A final risk worth noting is the legislative prerogative to reduce
funding of water resources agencies, which impacts the assessment,
monitoring, and enforcement of the public trust. Nevada again of-
217. Garrison, Proposal for Decision, supra note 215, at 22.
218. Id. at 22-23.
219. Justice Ronald B. Robie, Effective Implementation of the Public Thust Doctrine in Cali-
fornia Water Resources Decision-Making: A View From the Bench, 45 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1155,
1167-69 (2012).
220. See discussions supra Parts L.A and II.A.1.
221. Robie, supra note 219, at 1167.
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fers an example. In the 1980s, Washoe County, Nevada, applied to
the State Engineer for a basin transfer that would move 28,588 an-
nual acre-feet of water to the Truckee Meadows metropolitan ar-
ea.222 The Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe and neighboring Lassen
County opposed the transfer on environmental and economic
grounds, arguing that there were less extreme alternatives than wa-
ter importation.223
The State Engineer granted the applications without inde-
pendently determining whether the applications harmed the pub-
lic interest-a statutory criterion under Nevada law.2 24 Instead, the
State Engineer limited his review to the four corners of the appli-
cations, presumed that Washoe County itself must have looked at
other alternatives, and deferred to the applicant's choice.225 The
Nevada Supreme Court upheld the permit, citing in part the "lack
of resources" available to the State Engineer's "relatively small
staff":
In the present case, the State Engineer recognized his office does
not have the resources or personnel to weigh the social and polit-
ical factors inherent in an economic analysis of competing water
projects.
Accordingly, we conclude that the State Engineer did not commit
a dereliction of duty by not including a review of economic con-
siderations and alternative projects as part of the guidelines de-
fining the public interest.226
In a strong dissent, Justice Springer lamented that the court's
decision, affecting a "massive inter-basin water transfer," lacked
sound judgment: "It is difficult to accept the contention that the
critical public interest issues presented by this case can be resolved
merely by inspection of the application documents themselves."2 27
The end result is that an applicant made the judgment call con-
cerning whether its own proposal was in the public interest. This
holding lays bare the vulnerability of tying the public trust to a
222. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Washoe Cnty., 918 P.2d 697, 698 (Nev. 1996).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 703, 707 (Springerj., dissenting).
226. Id. at 702.
227. Id. at 707 (Springer,J., dissenting).
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public interest statute. If the legislature and water agencies wish to
de-prioritize public interest review in economically lean times, they
can do so. Such a result is less likely to occur, however, if the pub-
lic trust remains framed as a fiduciary duty rather than a mere
statutory requirement.
G. Indicia of Agency Confusion Between the Public Interest and the Public
Trust
If, as noted above, judicial confusion exists concerning the
public interest and the public trust, then similar agency confusion
is to be expected. Unfortunately, because state water permitting
decisions are not readily available and searchable in most western
jurisdictions, it is difficult to identify the extent to which agencies
currently analyze the public trust in their decisions, or the extent
to which they blur the important distinction between the public
trust and public interest. Still, the limited evidence available sug-
gests that state agencies are indeed confused concerning their role
in public trust protection.
In California, which is arguably the most advanced state in its
implementation of the trust, Dave Owen's helpful analysis of agen-
cy decisions suggests that the public trust is mentioned in only half
of the state's combined decisions, and plays a significant factor in
only twelve percent of the state's combined decisions.228 Montana,
which also has a searchable orders database, appears to have only
two permit decisions raising public trust concerns; however, in
both instances the agency found those concerns did not affect ap-
proval of the applications. 25 In those decisions, there is evidence
that the agency conflated the public trust with both Montana's
basic water code review criteria and its public interest review provi-
sion, neither of which mention the public trust.230 Further, the
228. See Owen, supra note 82, at 1130-31.
229. In re Water Use Permit Application 49573-s43B (Carter), Final Order 9-10 (Mont.
Dep't Natural Res. & Conservation Jan. 20, 1986) (determining that the required mitiga-
tion obviated the need to analyze public trust impacts), available at
http://www.dnrc.mt.gov/wrd/water-rts/hearing_info/hearingorders/casenos 45172-
49643/049573-4b-carter.pdf, In re Water Use Permit Application 43104-s76D (Garrison),
Proposal for Decision 19-23 (Mont. Dep't Natural Res. & Conservation Dec. 16, 1987)
(adopting finding that objectors failed to prove impacts to the public trust), available at
http://www.dnrc.mt.gov/
wrd/water-rts/hearing-info/hearing-orders/casenos_42133-44339/043104-
76d.garrison.pdf. The agency's final order adopted this proposed finding. Final Order I
(Mont. Dep't Natural Res. & Conservation Jan. 14, 1988).
230. Carter, Final Order, supra note 229, at 10 ("It would appear that the legislature
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agency grappled with the question of whether it could even con-
sider the public trust in the absence of a statutory criterion on
point.2 3 ' And while Nevada and North Dakota water permitting
decisions are not readily searchable, agency officials in those states
confirm that the public trust is not specifically addressed during
permitting.232
In Hawaii, where its permitting agency is working to implement
the Waiahole Ditch decision through minimum instream flow re-
quirements, the permitting process does not yet expressly address
the public trust during permit review.233 In the meantime, the
agency is relying on existing instream flow provisions in state law as
a proxy for addressing the public trust. 23 4 But these instream flow
provisions, which predate Waiahole Ditch, expressly protect "public
interests" that are broader than the public trust, including eco-
nomic impacts2 35 and uses like aesthetics and hydropower, which
are not among the state's recognized trust purposes.236 Indeed,
Hawaii regulations state that notwithstanding instream flow im-
pacts, the agency can approve permits "in those situations where it
is clear that the best interest of the public will be served, as deter-
mined by the [agency]."
Based on this limited information alone, it is fair to infer that
the lack of public trust provisions in state water codes translates in-
has already considered the factors it believes are necessary to consider for the public trust,
and has set out those factors in [the standard permit review criteria]."); Garrivou, Proposal
for Decision, supra note 229, at 19-20 (inquiring whether the small amount of the diver-
sion, to which public interest review does not apply, means that there is no duty to exam-
ine the ptiblic trust).
231. Garrivon, Proposal for Decision, sufnu note 229, at 19-21.
232. Telephone Interview with Bob Shaver, Director of Water Appropriations Divi-
sion, North Dakota State Water Commission, (Sept. 10, 2012) (confirming that state ap-
plies only public interest criteria); Telephone Interview with Susan Joseph-Taylor, Chief,
Hearing Section, Nevada Division of Water Resources, (Sept. 11, 2012) (confirming public
trust has not yet been applied in a water permit proceeding).
233. Telephone Interview with Dean Uyeno, Hydrologist, Hawaii Commission on
Water Resource Management, (Apr. 11, 2013) [hereinafter Uyeno Interview].
234. Id.
235. HAW. REv. STAT. § 174C-71 (factoring in economic impact when establishing
instream flow standards) (2012); see also supra note 175 and related text.
236. HAW. ADMIN. R. § 13-169-2 (defining instream use broadly to include both trust
purposes such as navigation and non-trust purposes such as hydropower generation);
HAW. ADMIN. R. § 13-169-20(6) (2013) (including hydropower generation as an instream
use).
237. HAW. ADMIN. R. §§ 13-168-32(e), 13-169-52(c).
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to a lack of robust public trust protection by permitting agencies,
leaving them to fall back on traditional water code provisions that
favor private users and public interests not embodied in the public
trust. It is thus incumbent on courts, legislatures, and state agen-
cies to create an explicit, distinct public trust review.
III. BEST PRACTICES FOR PUBLIC TRUST REVIEW
Because most western states have special trustee obligations re-
lating to water, the reasoned approach is for those states to directly
address the public trust in their water codes. By drawing on public
trust ideas from around the West, the following set of best practic-
es emerges for conducting public trust review during water use
permitting. These recommendations are organized by best practic-
es to be codified into state water laws and regulations, best practic-
es for the judiciary, and best practices for state agencies engaged in
water planning. Because of the many variations in state water
codes, these recommendations are necessarily discussed in general
terms that will require adaptation to meet the unique nuances of
each state's water law.
At a minimum, the several states that have already applied the
public trust to water rights should be implementing these practic-
es.238 Beyond this core group of states, it is wise for other western
states that recognize the public trust over waters to implement the-
se practices as well.239 As long as state water codes fail to adequately
consider the public trust, states will remain vulnerable to allega-
tions that they are permitting private appropriations of water in
derogation of trust resources.240
Before embarking on a discussion of best practices, it is im-
portant to acknowledge that states, and water use agencies in par-
ticular, may face a heavy burden in bringing water codes into
compliance with public trust law.241 Agencies might legitimately
argue that the expense and administrative complexity of adding a
238. See discussion supra Part I.C.
239. State legislatures like Idaho's that have eschewed the public trust may eventually
have to face a similar reality if the courts conclude that state public trust obligations can-
not be legislatively nullified. See discussion supra Part I.B.
240. To name one example, advocates argue that Oregon should be implementing
public trust protections in its water rights permitting process. See Blumm & Doot, supra
note 114, at 395.
241. Thus is the story of Hawaii, where its state agency has been working for over a
decade to determine appropriate stream flow protections called for in the 2000 Waiahole
Ditch decision. Uyeno Interview, supra note 233.
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public trust analysis to an already time-consuming permit review
process will be substantial. Water use applicants, too, might argue
that such a review will further delay agency decisions. As well
founded as these arguments may be, they simply do not obviate the
state's important trustee obligation. The public trust "cannot be
relaxed simply because it may present . . . difficult factual ques-
tions," 242 administrative challenges, or funding concerns.
A. Legislative Changes to Water Use Permitting Laws
1. Defining the public trust
To start, state legislatures and permitting agencies must clearly
delineate public trust interests from more generalized public in-
terests. This distinction should appear in water codes, implement-
ing regulations, and agency guidance documents. In particular,
states must define the precise scope of the trust to be considered.
First, the types of waters protected under the public trust must be
specified so that agencies can determine whether or not the water
permit at issue involves protected trust resources. States adhering
to the narrower, federal definition of navigability will thus have
fewer protected waters than states applying the public trust to a
broader category of waters.243 Second, the scope of the public trust
should include the "trust trilogy" of commerce, navigation, and
fishing, in addition to any other specific public trust purposes rec-
ognized by the state in question. Guided by a clear trust definition,
there is less risk that an agency will consider other public interest
matters that fall outside the scope of the trust.2 44
242. Lawrence v. Clark Cnty., 254 P.3d 606, 614 (Nev. 2011). There, the court was
referring to challenges facing the courts, but the same observation arguably holds true for
government agencies as well.
243. For the federal definition of "navigable," see sufna notes 34 and 36. For a dis-
cussion of various state forruilations of "navigable," see Craig, Adapting to Climate Change,
sufna note 37, at 809-29. Admittedly, this threshold question may involve the arduous task
of classifying public trust waters based on fact-finding specific to each watercourse. What
states should avoid are sweeping approaches, such as those used by the Colorado Supreme
Court or the Arizona and Idaho Legislatures, wherein waters were classified as falling out-
side the public trust without any particularized assessment being done. See discussion su/na
notes 11, 187-99, and related text.
244. While some might argue that delimiting the universe of protected trust uses re-
duces the protection of water, it is a more honest application of the law. Moreover, as
demonstrated in Part II, "public interest" is politically malleable and, depending on the
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2. Separate public trust analysis as part of permit review
Next, and most importantly, states must codify a distinct public
trust assessment process for water rights permitting.245 Relying on
judicial directives in public trust case law is not enough. As Owen
has observed, "individual cases will effect systemic change only if
they spawn broadly applicable legislative or regulatory changes." 24 6
To meet the public trust baseline, agencies should apply this pub-
lic trust assessment separately from traditional permit criteria so
there is less risk of demoting the trust to merely another public in-
terest consideration. Agencies should also conduct the assessment
prior to issuing new water rights permits or approving changes of
use, and make factual findings that demonstrate careful considera-
tion and mitigation of trust impacts.
Idaho's Kootenai Environmental Alliance provides a helpful for-
mulation for public trust assessment, holding that "among other
things," the following factors should be examined:
* the degree of effect of the project on public trust uses,
navigation, fishing, recreation and commerce;
* the impact of the individual project on the public trust
resource;
* the impact of the individual project when examined
cumulatively with existing impediments to full use of
the public trust resource;
* the impact of the project on the public trust resource
when that resource is examined in light of the primary
purpose for which the resource is suited, such as com-
merce, navigation, fishing or recreation; and
persons in power, is more likely to be used as a tool to promote consumptive uses of water
under the auspices of promoting the public interest of economic development. Here too,
arguments might be made that the courts, the gatekeepers of the trust, are just as likely as
agencies or legislatures to introduce political bias or subjectivity. While such a risk is possi-
ble, it is far more remote than the risks associated with discretionary public interest deter-
minations made at the legislative or agency level. A multi-member state appellate court
must reach a majority consensus and locate its public trust rulings within an established
body of public trust law that, while sometimes evolving, is not as open-ended as water code
"public interest" provisions.
245. In light of legislative recalcitrance on this subject, the impetus for change may
lie in further beneficiary litigation that seeks additional court mandates to the legislature.
See, e.g., discussion supna Part I.C.
246. Owen, supra note 82, at 1103. He describes "a more robust procedural frame-
work for public trust analysis" as among the more promising reforms. Id. at 1107.
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* the degree to which broad public uses are set aside in
favor of more limited or private ones.2 47
Courts in Arizona and Nevada have since adopted these same
factors.248 In Arizona, the adopting court added that these factors
should be applied as part of a "particularized assessment," rather
than a generalized assessment that broadly disposes of trust re-
sources.249 Thus, states need to subject each water use permit, ra-
ther than selected permits or categories of permits, to public trust
review.
Some could argue that California's approach of simply impos-
ing a public trust condition on use permits, without necessarily an-
alyzing trust impacts in advance, is adequate because it leaves open
the possibility that agencies can later modify or revoke a permit if
the public trust is substantially impaired. Returning to the public
trust baseline described in Illinois Central, however, it is evident that
trust law depends upon an advance analysis.250 To hold that the
state cannot alienate trust resources, except under certain condi-
tions,251 is to require that the state establish before alienation that
those conditions have in fact been met.
Belatedly conducting public trust review also runs the risk that
valuable trust resources are irreparably harmed-a risk that a re-
sponsible trustee would not take. In particular, trustees should
consider irreparable harm when reviewing water project proposals
that will dramatically alter the hydrologic landscape. The City of
Los Angeles' long-term impacts to the Mono Lake ecosystem pro-
vide a case in point.252 Recognizing the risks of post hoc review of
247. Kootenai Envtl. Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club, 671 P.2d 1085, 1092-93 (Ida-
ho 1983) (describing the factors as a non-exclusive list, which leaves open the possibility of
other considerations relevant to assessing trust impacts). While the court lists recreation
among the public trust purposes for that state, such a purpose is not universally recog-
nized among the western states, and would thus be omitted in some jurisdictions. See dis-
ctussion supra Parts L.A and I.B.
248. Ariz. Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 170-71 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1991) (addressing riverbed lands); Lawrence v. Clark Cnty., 254 P.3d 606, 616-17.
(Nev. 2011).
249. Ilassell, 837 P.2d at 173 (striking down a law that broadly conveyed trust re-
sources within a single piece of legislation).
250. See discussion sul/pm Part I.A.
251. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455-56 (1892).
252. See discussion supa Part I.C.4.
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trust impacts, the Hawaii Supreme Court observed in Waiahole
Ditch:
Where scientific evidence is preliminary and not yet conclusive..
. it is prudent to adopt "precautionary principles" in protecting
the resource. That is, where there are present or potential threats
of serious damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be a
basis for postponing effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation.. . . In addition, where uncertainty exists, a trustee's
duty to protect the resource mitigates in favor of choosing pre-
sumptions that also protect the resource.253
There, water users proposed a change in use from irrigation to
water supply for a commercial resort development. While Hawaii's
water code lists both irrigation and commercial uses as beneficial
uses that are in the "public interest,"25 4 those uses do not fall with-
in trust purposes. Thus, as a first step the Hawaii Water Resources
Board could weigh a broad spectrum of public interests in deter-
mining that a resort development would benefit the public. But
from there, the agency needed to separately assess how a resort de-
velopment would impact the public trust purposes of the affected
waters. Because the agency did not adequately conduct this se-
cond, trust-based inquiry, and because it lacked the requisite data
to do so, it was inappropriate and premature to permit the change
in use. 255
Importantly, a separate public trust analysis need not replace
existing public interest review in the West. As with other permit re-
view criteria, states can continue to weigh a variety of considera-
tions when deciding whether to issue a permit. With a separate
public trust analysis, however, those competing considerations will
not be allowed to prevail if the impacts are too substantial under
public trust law.
253. In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole Ditch), 9 P.3d 409, 426 (Haw.
2000) (quoting Final Decision of the Commission on Water Resource Management (Dec.
24, 1997)) (emphasis omitted). But cf Owen, supra note 82, at 1133 & n.196 (discussing
California's use of scientific uncertainty to lift permit restrictions).
254. HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-2(c) (2012).
255. The Hawaii Supreme Court required further instream flow studies by the appli-
cant before the agency could proceed. See discussion supra Part I.C.7 and related notes 93-
98.
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Further, protecting the public trust does not mean that private
water uses are inevitably prohibited. Dunning documents that
"[m]ost courts have permitted the alienation of state sovereign
lands," along with conditions to ameliorate public trust impacts.25 6
Additionally, agencies can determine that a private use promotes
public trust purposes. Kootenai Environmental Alliance aptly illus-
trates this point. There, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld an en-
croachment permit for a private yacht club on Lake Coeur d'Alene
to construct sailboat slips and related facilities. 2 7 The court agreed
with the state agency's finding that the construction would enlarge
recreation opportunities and would not substantially impair navi-
gation or fishing. 25 8 The court observed that the proposal did not
violate the trust "at this time," but cautioned that "the state is not
precluded from determining in the future that this conveyance is
no longer compatible with the public trust imposed on this con-
veyance. "259
As another, hypothetical example, a western state might recog-
nize navigation, commerce, fishing, and recreation as public trust
purposes. Applications to change water rights or to develop new
water rights would thus require an inquiry into whether those trust
purposes will be impacted by the proposed use. A consumptive
use, such as an out-of-basin transfer, might benefit the "public in-
terest" but nonetheless deplete the water supply to such a degree
that recreation is compromised, or require a diversion structure
that impairs critical public access to waters. In contrast, an irrigator
who seeks to upgrade the efficiency of a diversion and lease a por-
tion of the salvaged water for instream flow might be proposing a
private use that contemporaneously benefits recreation. Similarly,
a consumptive user who stores water during high spring flows and
leaves water instream during low summer flows may be proposing a
use that is compatible with trust purposes.
256. DUNNING, sunua note 18, at § 30.02(d) (2) (citing several examples). Illinois Cen-
tralallows for alienation of trust resources in the situation when there is an "improvement
of the navigation and use of the waters" or when there is no "impairment of the public
interest in what remains." 146 U.S. at 453.
257. Kootenai Envtl. Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club, 671 P.2d 1085, 1094 (Idaho
1983).
258. Id. at 1095.
259. Id. at 1094.
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3. Procedural protections during permit review
Stronger public trust protection means moving from judicial
decisions to on-the-ground agency processes that focus on trust re-
sources. As Owen has discerned, a "more robust procedural
framework" is essential for reforming public trust review and for
"addressing the information shortages that the agencies charged
with protecting trust resources routinely face." 26 0 Following the di-
rectives of the Idaho and Hawaii courts, agency public trust review
should place the burden on the water use applicant to show a lack
of substantial impairment to the trust.2 6 1 This burden should be
expressly codified as part of the permit process to ensure that trust
review occurs proactively. By doing so, states eliminate the risk of
imposing a de facto burden on trust beneficiaries who attempt to
raise trust concerns later in the permitting process.262
State codes should also expressly address standing to raise pub-
lic trust issues during permit review so that interested parties have
a clear process for proceeding in water rights cases. In California,
for example, "any member of the general public [can] raise a
claim of harm to the public trust."26 3 And Montana, in the context
of water rights adjudication, has recognized a more limited stand-
ing for parties with a "particularized interest" in the public trust.2 64
4. Permit conditions and monitoring
Western state water laws must also expressly address how states
260. Owen, supra note 82, at 1107 (discussing California, but making an observation
applicable to all western states). Owen compares the lack of public trust procedure to the
extensive procedures in other environmental laws and laments that the California courts
have done little to clarify the procedural requirements of the public trust. Id. at 1143 &
n.244.
261. See discussion supra Part II.E and related notes 206-09. To the extent state water
planning also becomes more robust in its attention to the public trust, applicants will have
better access to the types of information relevant to public trust review during permitting.
See discussion infra Part III.C.
262. See discussion supra Part IIE. Although Owen notes that contemporaneous re-
view tinder the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) has helped fill some of the
procedural gaps in that state, Owen, supra note 82, at 1143, CEQA's standards and public
trust standards do not necessarily align in all cases. See discussion supra note 87. Further, in
other states, environmental review may not apply to all water rights permitting. Ultimately,
environmental review cannot take the place of robust public trust procedures set forth di-
rectly in state water codes.
263. Owen, supra note 82, at 1143 (citing In re Water of Hallett Creek Sys., 749 P.2d
324, 337 n.16 (Cal. 1988).
264. Montana Trout Unlimited v. Beaverhead Water Co., 255 P.3d 179, 185-86
(Mont. 2011); see abso discussion supra Part I.C.8.
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fulfill their ongoing duty of care for the trust. Public trust authority
"empowers the state to revis it prior diversions and allocations,
even those made with due consideration of their effect on the pub-
lic trust."2 65 As discussed, California has the only regulations that
expressly require a permit condition regarding continuing state
oversight of the public trust.266 This type of notice sets realistic wa-
ter user expectations, strengthens a state's defense against future
takings claims, 267 and ameliorates arguments that the public pur-
poses of the trust resource have been relinquished.
Nonetheless, California's boilerplate permit condition is no
substitute for permit conditions tailored to the specific water use
proposed.268 As Arizona courts have held, permits require particu-
larized assessments that include "conditions that may be necessary
to any transfer to assure that public trust interests remain protect-
ed." 269 In other words, the more tailored the conditions, the better
the prospect that the state can enforce trust protections.
Further, permit conditions must exist beyond the paper on
which they are printed-they must shift from a "theoretical man-
date" to a "real procedural obligation." 2 70 For this reason, state
water codes should also identify the agencies responsible for moni-
toring trust impacts. And as Owen advocates, legislatures should
empower agency oversight by providing appropriate funding and
access to data.27' Using California as an example, he suggests as a
starting place that water users "participate in or provide financial
support for an ongoing monitoring program" and that agencies be
authorized to "demand information from water users whose activi-
ties may create significant public trust impacts."2 72
265. In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole Ditch), 9 P.3d 409, 453 (Haw.
2000).
266. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 780(a) (2012); see also supra Part I.C.4 (providing the
text of the permit condition).
267. See Frank, supra note 2, at 681-84 (providing an overview of the current legal
developments regarding public trust and takings claims).
268. As noted, Owen has found evidence of some permit decisions that substantively
address the public trust. See discussion supia note 87. Nonetheless, express regulatory re-
quirements would make the practice routine and mandatory.
269. Ariz. Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 173 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1991) (involving riverbed lands).
270. Owen, supra note 82, at 1117, 1144 & n.111.
271. Id. at 1149-50.
272. Id. at 1149.
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B. Strengthened Judicial Review
The judiciary, which serves as the gatekeeper of the public
trust, can help create the appropriate context for protecting the
public trust during permitting. Foremost, judicial discussion of the
public trust doctrine should use more precise, careful language
that differentiates trust interests from more generalized public in-
terests. While a careful reader of public trust opinions can observe
judicial intent to treat the two concepts as separate, judicial deci-
sions can do far more to note the distinction.
Following the court holdings of Idaho, Arizona, Hawaii, and
Washington, reviewing courts also should eschew traditional agen-
cy deference when considering public trust appeals. Commenta-
tors have noted that California courts in particular need to raise
their standard of review above ordinary deference when the public
trust is at issue.273 Because states serve as trustee of the public's re-
sources, 274 judges should take a "close look" at agency public trust
decisions275 and apply "a heightened degree of judicial scrutiny,
'as if they were measuring that legislation against constitutional
protections."' 2 76 Indeed, because many states have grounded their
public trust doctrines in their state constitutions, no lesser stand-
ard will suffice.277
C. State Water Planning for the Public Trust
Finally, as the North Dakota, California, and Hawaii courts
have indicated, advance water planning is integral to understand-
ing whether proposed water uses will impact the public trust. Thus,
state water laws should explicitly require agencies to "take the pub-
lic trust into account in the planning and allocation of water re-
sources."278 The North Dakota courts have gone so far as to re-
273. SeeJustice Robie, supra note 219, at 1167-69 (critiquing the California courts'
deferential review of the State Water Resource Control Board).
274. See discussion supra Part IA.
275. Kootenai Envtl. Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club, 671 P.2d 1085, 1092 (Idaho
1983).
276. Weden v. San Juan Cnty., 958 P.2d 273, 283 (Wash. 1998); see also Ariz. Ctr. for
Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 169 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); In reWater Use
Permit Applications (Waiahole Ditch), 9 P.3d 409, 455-56 (Haw. 2000); KOCH, JR., supra
note 28, § 11:11 (discussing de novo review of constitutional questions).
277. See discussion supra Part I.B.
278. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709, 728. (Cal. 1983); see also
Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 453 (holding that protecting the public trust in planning is the
state's "affirmative duty"); United Plainsmen Ass'n v. N.D. State Water Conservation
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quire this step, which must consider both existing supply and fu-
ture demand, before permitting can occur.279
Despite North Dakota's mandate, the state's most recent water
management plan does not mention the public trust.280 Other
western states fare little better. South Dakota's water plan is silent
on the public trust,28' and Montana's water plan online summary
not only ignores the public trust, but also emphasizes that
"[c]ontinued economic growth in Montana depends on meeting
water demand for population growth and economic development
while satisfying existing beneficial uses."28 2
Some state water plans mention the public trust, but mainly in
aspirational terms. For example, the preamble to Hawaii's plan
generally notes that "offstream uses" are subject to a public trust
analysis and that wild and scenic river designations, along with al-
ternative water sources, will be used to protect the trust.28 3 Neva-
da's water plan defines the public trust in its glossary but does not
use the term in any substantive provisions. 28 4 Further, its definition
of public trust states that the reader should also see the definitions
for "public interest" and "public welfare," thus improperly con-
flating those concepts. 2 5 California has by far the most references
to the public trust in its plan, noting in general terms, but not spe-
cifics, that state water planning must factor in public trust consid-
erations.28 6 Thus, on the whole, state water planning laws appear to
Conm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457, 463-64 (N.D. 1976).
279. United Plainsmen Ass'a, 247 N.W.2d at 463.
280. N.D. STATE ENG'R, NORTH DAKOTA 2013-2015 WATER DEVELOPMENT PLAN,
available at
http://www.swc.nd.gov/4dlink9/4dcgi/GetSubCategoiyPDF/151/Water%2ODevelopmen
t%20Report.pdf (last visitedJine 6, 2013).
281. S.D. DEP'T OF NATURAL RES., STATE WATER PLAN,
http://deir.sd.gov/dfta/wwf/
statewaterplan/statewaterplan.aspx#Resources (last visited Apr. 13, 2013).
282. MONT. DEP'T NATURAL RES. & CONSERVATION., MONTANA STATE WATER PLAN,
http://www.dnrc.nt.gov/wrd/watei mgnt/state-water plan/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2013).
283. HAW. COMM'N ON WATER RES. MGMT., HAWAI WATER PROJECTS PLAN vii, 2-3 to
-4(2003).
284. NEV. Div. WATER PLANNING, NEVADA STATE WATER PLAN (Mar. 2009) 6-7, 8-9 to
-10, available a
http://water.nv.gov/programs/planning/stateplan/docimen ts/NV.State_
WaterPlan-cornplete.pdf.
285. Id. at 8-9 to -10.
286. CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RES., CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE 2009 (Dec. 2009),
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require the same public trust modernizations as state water codes.
While macro-level planning documents will never take the
place of particularized public trust assessments during permit re-
view, they are the first step in informing agencies, the public, and
prospective water users about the public trust issues associated with
particular watercourses.28 7 As one important component of plan-
ning, Gray proposes the use of best available science to establish a
baseline of water needed in a watercourse to fulfill public trust
purposes, including an adequate margin of safety to account for
changes in hydrology and other variables.288 Another important
component is state funding for public trust initiatives, so that the
western states' trustee responsibilities do not remain an unfunded
judicial mandate.
Ultimately, this advance planning can serve as a feedback loop
that provides state agencies, applicants, and the public with specif-
ic public trust data during the water use permitting process. This
planning can also guide water management and funding decisions
toward state projects that better consider the public trust, thus in-
creasing the likelihood that both public trust and private water use
interests can be satisfied through the use of state waters.
IV. CONCLUSION
As western states have begun to recognize the interrelationship
between the public trust and water rights, so too must they begin
to update their water codes to reflect public trust principles. In
light of their baseline public trust duties, states that recognize a
public trust over waters must do more than rely on agencies to di-
vine the role of the public trust in permitting. Further, states
should not hitch their wagons to politically expedient but ill-fitting
fixes such as statutory public interest review. Ultimately, the job of
protecting the trust falls on many shoulders, and includes careful
and accurate review by the courts, legislative adoption of required
available al http://www.waterplan.water.ca.gov/docs/cwpu2009/0310final/
v2_allcwp2009 .pdf. The Delta Plan and Bay Delta Conservation Plan appear to be an ex-
ception, with specific state statutes calling for "new flow criteria for the Delta ecosystem
necessary to protect public trust resources." CAL. WATER CODE§ 85086 (2012).
287. See Gray, supra note 123, at 999 (advocating for planning in California as a "pro-
spective feature of the public trust [that] is just as important as its remedial aspects").
288. Id. at 1017. Hawaii is working toward this approach to some extent, as it sets its
interim and permanent stream flow levels on key watercourses in the state, which in turn
limit the extent of new offstream uses. Uyeno Interview, supra note 233. California appears
to be doing the same in the Bay Delta area. See supra note 286.
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trust review, and agency implementation in accordance with a
state's established trust parameters. By drawing upon the best ideas
throughout the West, states can build a public trust framework that
becomes standard practice in water use permitting in the West.

